



# Ground Operations Safety Manual

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## Amendment Records

The amendments listed below have been incorporated into this copy of the Ground Operations Safety Manual.

Issue No.	Revision No.	Description of Change	Effective Date
2	1	<p>Chapter 1 – Introduction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated section 1.3 on oversight framework</li> <li>• Updated section 1.4.4 on references</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 2 – Safety Management System [Major review]</p> <p>Chapter 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added sub-section 5.1.2 on Fire Prevention and Protection</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (h) in sub-section 5.3.2.2 under Safe driving and parking of ground support equipment inside ERA</li> <li>• Added paragraph (i) in sub-section 5.3.2.2 under Safe driving and parking of ground support equipment inside ERA</li> <li>• Added paragraph (o) in sub-section 5.3.5.2 under Mandatory deployment of wheel chocks / stabilisers on motorised ground support equipment</li> <li>• Added paragraph (g) in sub-section 5.3.6.1 Action when vehicle catches fire</li> <li>• Added section 4.4.2 on Requirements for accessories worn</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (a), (i), (j) in sub-section 5.4.3.1 under Airside rules</li> <li>• Added paragraph (k) in sub-section 5.4.3.1 under Airside rules</li> <li>• Added sub-section 5.7.1.5 under General term for FOD</li> <li>• Added sub-section 5.7.2.5 under Consequences of FOD</li> <li>• Edited sub-section 5.7.6.1 under FOD checks before live aircraft arrival or towing-in aircraft arriving into the stand</li> </ul>	01 Feb 2025

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited sub-section 5.7.7.1 under FOD checks before live aircraft departure or aircraft towing-out from the stand</li> <li>• Added sub-section 5.7.7.2 and 5.7.7.3. under Engine Start</li> <li>• Edited paragraph 5.7.9.2 under What to do when carrying out regular activities at the airside</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 6</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited 6.3.3.2 Pre-Arrival table</li> <li>• Edited step 2 for 6.3.3.3 Normal Arrival (APU serviceable)</li> <li>• Edited 6.4.3 Details of the Standardised Departure Procedure</li> <li>• Addition of Note under sub-section 6.4.3</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 7</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited section 7.1 Pre-arrival Handling</li> <li>• Replaced paragraph (g) in section 7.2</li> <li>• Added paragraph (h) in section 7.2</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 8</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited paragraph (g) in sub-section 8.1</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 9</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited sub-section 9.2.1 Basic operating requirements for GSE</li> <li>• Added paragraph (k) in 9.2.2 Ramp safety in aircraft handling</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (h) and added paragraph (i) in sub-section 9.3.1 Pre-operation equipment inspection (motorised GSE)</li> <li>• Added sub-section 9.3.6 Tall non-motorised equipment</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (c) and Note in sub-section 9.3.7 Motorised and non-motorised passenger steps/stairs</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (e) and added paragraph (g), (m) and (n) in sub-section 9.3.8 Belt loader/skyloader</li> <li>• Edited sub-section 9.3.9 Transporter/JCPL/MDL</li> </ul>	
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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited sub-section 9.3.10 Elevating equipment</li> <li>• Added sub-section 9.3.12 Tractor</li> <li>• Removal of original section 9.5 on Low-wing aircraft</li> <li>• Edited sub-section 9.5.2 on connection of grounding cables</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 10</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Edited sub-section 10.1.1 under Pre-departure handling</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (b) and added subparagraphs (a) and (b) under sub-section 10.1.2 under Pre-departure handling</li> <li>• Edited 10.2.1 under Departure handling</li> <li>• Added Note for sub-section 10.3.1 under Pushback operations</li> <li>• Added paragraph (d), (k), (i) and edited paragraph (e) and (n) in sub-section 10.3.2 under Airtug and tow bar operations</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (b), (f) and (m) in sub-section 10.3.3 under Towbar-less airtug operations</li> <li>• Added paragraph (d) and (e), and edited paragraph (m) in sub-section 10.3.4 under Remote-controlled pushback operations</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (c), (d), (g) and k) in sub-section 10.4.1. under Wing walker</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 11</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added paragraph (c) and (m), and edited paragraph (x) in sub-section 11.1.1 under Towing operations</li> <li>• Removed Note in sub-section 11.1.1 under Towing operations</li> <li>• Added section 11.2 Role of the brake operator</li> <li>• Edited paragraph (c), (f), (i), (j) and (l) in sub-section 11.4.1 under Towing manoeuvring</li> </ul>	
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		<p>Chapter 12</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added image for section 12.6 Contingency procedure for unserviceable CAFHI Emergency Stop Buttons</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 13 – Training and Competency of Personnel of Ground Service Providers [sizeable changes]</p> <p>Chapter 14</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added paragraph (c) and Note in sub-section 14.2.1 under Maintenance programme</li> <li>• Added paragraph 14.2.2.1 under Periodic checks/servicing</li> <li>• Added sub-section 14.2.3 under Maintenance programme</li> <li>• Edited paragraph 14.2.6.1 under Treatment of unserviceable GSE</li> <li>• Added sub-sections 14.3.2 and 14.3.3 under Fire protection</li> </ul> <p>Chapter 15 – Contractor Management (sizeable changes)</p>	
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## Glossary

<b>ACC</b>	Airside Control Centre
<b>ACU</b>	Air-Conditioning Unit
<b>ADGS</b>	Aircraft Docking Guidance System
<b>ADP</b>	Airfield Driving Permit
<b>AES</b>	Airport Emergency Services
<b>AMC</b>	Airside Management Centre
<b>APU</b>	Auxiliary Power Unit
<b>AVP</b>	Airfield Vehicle Permit
<b>CAAS</b>	Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
<b>CAFHI</b>	Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte Ltd
<b>CAG</b>	Changi Airport Group (S) Pte Ltd
<b>CCTV</b>	Closed-Circuit TeleVision camera
<b>ERA</b>	Equipment Restraint Area
<b>ESA</b>	Equipment Staging Area
<b>ETA</b>	Estimated Time of Arrival
<b>FOD</b>	Foreign Object Debris
<b>FMC</b>	Fault Management Centre
<b>FSM</b>	Fire Safety Manual
<b>FSZ</b>	Fueling Safety Zone
<b>GOSM</b>	Ground Operations Safety Manual
<b>GOM</b>	Ground Operations Manual
<b>GPU</b>	Ground Power Unit
<b>GSE</b>	Ground Service Equipment
<b>GHA</b>	Ground Handling Agent
<b>GSP</b>	Ground Service Providers
<b>IATA</b>	International Air Transport Association
<b>IGOM</b>	IATA Ground Operations Manual
<b>JCPL</b>	Joint Container Pallet Loader
<b>KCZ</b>	Keep Clear Zone
<b>MARS</b>	Multiple Aircraft Receiving Stand

<b>MDL</b>	Main Deck Loader
<b>PED</b>	Portable Electronic Device
<b>PLB</b>	Passenger Loading Bridge
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>RT</b>	Radio Telephony
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure
<b>TEP</b>	Temporary Entry Permit
<b>ULD</b>	Unit Load Device
<b>VHF</b>	Very High Frequency

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose and Scope

- 1.1.1 The CAG Airside GOSM defines CAG's ground handling safety standards for GSPs at Changi Airport to ensure ground operation activities are safely accomplished. It defines the minimum ground handling standards and procedures to operate safely at Changi Airport.
- 1.1.2 In doing so, CAG seeks to mitigate safety risks of the following ground operational activities:
- (a) Aircraft Power-In Arrival and Aircraft Power-Out Departure\*;
  - (b) Aircraft Powerback\*;
  - (c) Aircraft Marshalling;
  - (d) Operation of Passenger Loading Bridge;
  - (e) Operation of GSE Associated with Aircraft Handling and Loading;
  - (f) Aircraft Pushback;
  - (g) Aircraft Towing;
  - (h) Aircraft Fuelling.

**\*Note: Not applicable to Changi Airport**

**If any function is outsourced to an external third party, the GSP shall establish direct oversight to ensure that the function is conducted safely.**

## 1.2 Applicability

- 1.2.1 This document shall be used by GSPs at Changi Airport as one of the main documents in the conduct of ground handling functions. The contents of this document are applicable unless otherwise approved by CAG.
- 1.2.2 The GSP shall notify CAG of any deviations from the published GOSM and its timeline for addressing the deviation. If there GSP wishes to maintain the deviation, it should seek CAG's formal approval for a waiver
- 1.2.3 This document provides the basis for which CAG airside inspections and audits shall be conducted.
- 1.2.4 All standards in this document always contain the word "shall" to denote a requirement. For recommended practices, they will be represented by the word "should".

### **1.3 Oversight Framework**

1.3.1 The CAG oversight framework consists of safety inspections, performance reports/bilateral meetings and audits.

#### **1.3.1.1 Safety inspections**

1.3.1.1.1 Monthly inspections are conducted on the six applicable activities stated in 1.1.2. Non-conformance to SOPs are identified and shared with GSPs. GSPs are required to follow up and revert with corrective actions.

#### **1.3.1.2 Performance reports / Bilateral meetings**

1.3.1.2.1 Regular (e.g. quarterly) bilateral meetings and/or performance reports would inform GHA senior management on their safety performance and areas of concern.

#### **1.3.1.3 Audits**

1.3.1.3.1 All GSPs operating in Changi Airport shall attain a recognised industry standard certification (e.g. ISAGO, JIG).

1.3.1.3.2 The safety system audit will be conducted on a biennial basis (on alternate years with the GOSM update year) on GSPs with recognised industry standard certification. Otherwise, the audit will be conducted on an annual basis till the GSP attains its industry standard certification.

### **1.4 Updating of Ground Operations Safety Manual**

#### **1.4.1 Procedure**

1.4.1.1 The updating of the GOSM is scheduled biennially (on alternate years with the safety system audit year) and seeks consultation from respective subject matter officers for their relevant inputs. All relevant stakeholders' agreement should be obtained.

1.4.1.2 To facilitate the GOSM update, a gap analysis shall also be conducted with the IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM) and IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM) which are published each year.

#### **1.4.2 Incorporation of Airside Operations Notices and Airside Safety Notices**

1.4.2.1 All relevant Airside Operations Notices (AONs) and Airside Safety Notices (ASNs) shall be included in the GOSM during the biennial update.

1.4.2.2 Prior to the promulgation of the updated GOSM, the AONs and ASNs remain valid and all GSPs are required to comply with the stated safety procedures and requirements.

1.4.2.3 GSPs shall exercise due diligence to ensure prompt submission of evidence to CAG to demonstrate that they incorporate the content of AONs and ASNs involving changes to ground handling procedures, SOPs and training materials when the AONs are published.

### 1.4.3 Change Request

- 1.4.3.1 In situations where certain procedures and standards may have to change to cope with the new safety and operational challenges, the GSPs are welcome to propose any changes by writing in to CAG, Airside Operations.

### 1.4.4 References

- 1.4.4.1 This version of the GOSM has been published with reference to the following documents:
- a) IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM), 45th Edition;
  - b) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (Changi Airport) By-Laws 2009;
  - c) IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM), 13<sup>th</sup> Edition 2022;
  - d) ISAGO Standards Manual, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition (Effective Jan 2021);
  - e) EN ISO 20471:2013, New Standard for High Visibility Clothing;
  - f) Airside Driving Theory Handbook, 5th Edition (English); and
  - g) Fire Safety Manual (FSM) (Effective Oct 2024).

## 2 Safety Management System

### 2.1 Introduction to Safety Management System

- 2.1.1 ICAO Annex 19 – Safety Management, defines SMS as “a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures”. ICAO Doc 9859 – Safety Management Manual further elaborates that SMS should assist the service provider to continuously improve safety through identifying hazards, collecting and analysing safety data and safety information and continuous assessment of safety risks. This will enable the service provider to proactively contain or mitigate risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents.
- 2.1.2 All GSPs operating at Changi Airport shall have a SMS. Refuelling agents are allowed to adopt a different safety framework, e.g., Health, Safety, Security and Environment (HSSE) that fulfils the same purposes as a SMS and complies with the requirements of this chapter.
- 2.1.3 The GSP shall hold overall responsibility for the safety of services they provide, even if it may be outsourced a third-party. The safety standards specified in the GSP’s SMS shall not be reduced by any products and services provided by external organisations.
- 2.1.4 GSPs should share with the relevant stakeholders any audit reports and findings that need a joint corrective action.

### 2.2 Components of a Safety Management System

Component	Element
1. Safety policy and objectives	Management commitment
	Safety accountability and responsibilities
	Appointment of key safety personnel
	Coordination of emergency response planning
2. Safety risk management	SMS documentation
	Hazard identification
3. Safety assurance	Safety risk assessment and mitigation
	Safety performance monitoring and measurement
	Management of change
4. Safety promotion	Continuous improvement of SMS
	Training and education
	Safety communication

## **2.3 Management Commitment**

- 2.3.1 Management commitment and safety leadership is key to the implementation of an effective SMS and is asserted through the safety policy and the establishment of safety objectives. Management commitment to safety is demonstrated through management decision-making and allocation of resources; these decisions and actions should always be consistent with the safety policy and objectives to cultivate a positive safety culture.
- 2.3.2 GSPs shall ensure that management commitment to safety is formally expressed in a safety policy statement, which captures the service provider's philosophy on safety management, and its key safety objectives. The safety policy should be endorsed by the Accountable Executive and senior management, and minimally reflect management's commitment to:
- a) Continually improve safety performance;
  - b) Provide necessary resources, such as financial, manpower and training, for safety management;
  - c) Comply with applicable regulations and guidance;
  - d) Prioritize safety as a primary responsibility of all personnel; and
  - e) Promote and maintain a positive safety culture within the organisation.
- 2.3.3 The safety policy shall also include safety reporting procedures and clearly indicate what types of operational behaviours are unacceptable related to the GSP's aviation activities. The safety policy shall be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the organisation, and GSP should ensure that it is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels.
- 2.3.4 Key safety personnel should be consulted in the development of the safety policy and safety objectives to promote a sense of shared responsibility.
- 2.3.5 Safety objectives shall be established taking into account the safety policy, safety priorities and identified significant safety risks.
- 2.3.6 GSP shall clearly communicate the safety policy and objectives to all personnel, and regularly review them to ensure that they remain relevant and appropriate.
- 2.3.7 The safety policy and safety objectives shall be reviewed minimally on an annual basis or whenever required, to ensure they remain current.

## **2.4 Safety Accountability and Responsibilities**

- 2.4.1 GSP is to appoint an Accountable Executive to hold overall accountability for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS. The Accountable Executive shall be responsible for the:
- a) Provision and allocation of adequate resources such as financial and manpower for the effective implementation of SMS;
  - b) Promotion of a positive safety culture;
  - c) Establishment and communication of the organisation's safety policy and safety objectives;
  - d) Establishment, monitoring, review and improvement of safety performance; and



e) Implementation and improvement of the SMS.

- 2.4.2 GSP shall clearly define, document and communicate the accountability and responsibilities of the management and personnel (including relevant departmental and/or unit managers, and line managers) with respect to safety-related functions or duties. This could include being responsible for safety performance, ensuring appropriate mitigating measures and corrective actions are taken to address reported hazards and errors, as well as responding to accidents and incidents.
- 2.4.3 Where appropriate, the GSP should interface its SMS with external organisation's SMS or relevant safety systems. For example, where products or services are provided or supported by an external organisation, such as a contractor or subcontractor, the service provider should ensure that the external organisation meets its safety requirements. Policies and procedures should be established to clearly define the safety accountability and authority flow between the service provider and the external organisation.
- 2.4.4 Although responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the SMS may be delegated, the accountable executive shall not delegate responsibility for the system, nor can decisions regarding safety risks be delegated.
- 2.4.5 The authority to make decisions regarding safety risk tolerability shall be defined. This includes who can make decisions on the acceptability of risks as well as the authority to agree that a change can be implemented. The authority may be assigned to an individual, a management staff or a committee. The authority to make safety risk tolerability decisions should commensurate with the manager's general decision-making and resource allocation authority. Risk levels that exceed the manager's authority are to be escalated to a higher management level with greater authority.

## **2.5 Appointment of Key Safety Personnel**

- 2.5.1 GSP shall appoint a Safety Manager who is responsible for:
- a) Advising the Accountable Executive and line managers on safety management matters;
  - b) Managing the implementation of SMS;
    - Performing or facilitating hazard identification, and safety risk analysis;
    - Monitoring safety risk control and corrective actions and evaluating their results;
    - Providing periodic reports on the service provider's safety performance;
    - Maintaining aviation safety-related records and documentation;
    - Planning and facilitating personnel training related to aviation safety;
    - Monitoring safety concerns in the aviation industry and their perceived impact on the service provider's operations.
  - c) Maintaining the SMS.

- 2.5.2 The Safety Manager may hold other concurrent appointments, provided there is no conflict of interest, and the Safety Manager shall maintain a direct reporting line to the Accountable Executive to ensure independence of advice relating to the implementation and maintenance of a SMS.
- 2.5.3 GSP should establish a platform, chaired by the Accountable Executive and composed of senior managers responsible for functional and administrative areas. This platform is to provide strategic directions for safety policies and oversees the organisational safety performance, and it should:
- a) Monitor the effectiveness of the SMS and associated safety management processes;
  - b) Assess safety performance against the safety provider's safety policy and objectives;
  - c) Ensure that any necessary safety risk control action is taken in a timely manner;
  - d) Review the effectiveness of safety risk mitigation strategies;
  - e) Ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to achieve the desired safety performance.
- 2.5.4 GSP should drive SMS activities and implement safety strategies at the operational level through activities such as:
- a) Ensure that safety risk management activities, such as hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation are carried out;
  - b) Assess the impact of operational changes or new technologies to aviation safety;
  - c) Coordinate and implement safety risk controls and corrective actions in a timely manner;
  - d) Review the effectiveness of safety risk controls and corrective actions;
  - e) Coordinate safety promotion activities to raise awareness in safety matters.

## **2.6 Coordination of Emergency Response Planning**

- 2.6.1 An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) identifies aviation-related emergency scenarios and corresponding actions to be taken to ensure safe continuation of the service provider's operations and the return to normal operations as soon as possible. Such scenarios may include occurrences of accidents, serious incidents, or any events that could affect the safety of aviation operations. A service provider's ERP should also be coordinated with external stakeholders and interface with their respective ERPs.
- 2.6.2 The GSP's ERP should, where appropriate:
- a) Identify foreseeable emergencies;
  - b) Establish the emergency authority, and respective roles and responsibilities of units and personnel involved;
  - c) Identify actions to be taken by responsible personnel during an emergency, including those of external organisations;
  - d) Detail the coordination procedures including with external stakeholders to manage the emergency.

- 2.6.3 The ERP shall be documented, reviewed and regularly tested through exercises and reviewed to maintain its relevance.

## **2.7 SMS documentation**

- 2.7.1 The GSP shall establish and maintain a SMS manual that describes the components and elements in its SMS, and their associated policies and procedures. The SMS manual may be a stand-alone document or section within existing manuals maintained by the GSP, with reference to relevant documents as necessary. The documentation should be adapted and written to address the day-to-day safety management activities that can be easily understood by personnel throughout the organisation.

- 2.7.2 The SMS manual should include a detailed description of the GSP's policies, processes and procedures such as:

- a) Safety policy and safety objectives;
- b) Safety accountabilities and key safety personnel;
- c) Voluntary and mandatory safety reporting system processes and procedures;
- d) Hazard identification and safety risk assessment processes and procedures;
- e) Safety investigation procedures;
- f) Procedures for establishing and monitoring safety performance indicators;
- g) SMS training processes and procedures and communication;
- h) Safety communication processes and procedures;
- i) Internal audit procedures;
- j) Management of change procedures;
- k) SMS documentation management procedures

- 2.7.3 SMS documentation also includes the compilation and maintenance of operational records substantiating the existence and ongoing operation of the SMS. Operational records are the outputs of the SMS processes and procedures and should be stored and kept in accordance with existing retention periods. Examples of SMS operational records include:

- a) SMS implementation plan (during implementation process);
- b) Occurrence (accident and incident) reports and investigations;
- c) Hazards register and reports;
- d) Safety performance indicators and related charts;
- e) Records of completed safety risk assessments;
- f) Records of internal SMS reviews or audits;
- g) Training records;
- h) Records of safety promotion activities;
- i) Minutes of SMS-related meetings.

## **2.8 Hazard Identification**

- 2.8.1 Hazards may be related, but not limited, to:
- a) Design factors, such as equipment and task design;
  - b) Procedures and operating practices, such as documentation and checklists;

- c) Communications, such as language proficiency and terminology;
- d) Organisational factors, such as company policies for recruitment, training, remuneration and allocation of resources;
- e) Operational environment factors, such as ambient noise and vibration, temperature, lighting, protective equipment and clothing;
- f) Human factors, such as medical conditions, human performance limitations, and human-machine interface;
- g) Regulatory compliance factors, such as the applicability of regulations and the certification of equipment, personnel and procedures;
- h) Organisational or safety systems interfaces.

Note: Hazards are not to be confused with outcomes.

2.8.2 The GSP shall adopt a variety of methods including proactive and reactive methods to identify hazards. Proactive methods include:

- a) Collecting data from low severity incidents to identify potential hazards and trends;
- b) Engaging personnel in identifying and reporting hazards in their tasks;
- c) Conducting internal and external workshops and safety committees;
- d) Carrying out format inspections;
- e) Conducting safety surveys, operational safety audits, safety monitoring and safety assessments.

Reactive methods include:

- a) Trend monitoring and investigation of internal and external safety occurrences;
- b) Identifying and investigating irregularities and other non-routine operational occurrences that might be precursors to an accident or incident.

2.8.3 The GSP shall develop and maintain processes to identify hazards that could affect aviation safety. It is also important to consider hazards that may exist because of the SMS interface with external organisations, such as contractors. This may be done through analysis of existing processes or various safety data and information sources such as mandatory reports, voluntary and confidential safety reports, audits and investigations.

2.8.4 The GSP shall develop and maintain a process that ensures analysis, assessment and control of the safety risks associated with identified hazards.

2.8.5 Where appropriate and relevant, the GSP should implement policies, processes or initiatives that encourage the contribution, reporting or sharing of safety data and information from its personnel and relevant stakeholders, for hazards identification. These reporting systems shall be non-punitive and be easily accessible to all personnel.

## **2.9 Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

- 2.9.1 The GSP shall develop a safety risk assessment model and procedure to determine the safety risks associated with identified hazards, in a consistent and systematic approach. A typical safety risk assessment model combines the likelihood and severity assessments of an identified hazard to produce a safety risk index score. The GSP may customize the sample model or develop its own safety risk assessment model that suits its context.
- 2.9.2 Based on the risk assessment, the GSP shall take appropriate mitigation measures to eliminate or reduce the level of risks associated with hazards to an acceptable level. Typical risk mitigation measures include:
- a) cancelling the operation or activity because the risks exceed the benefits of continuing;
  - b) reducing the frequency of the operation or activity;
  - c) taking action to reduce likelihood/ severity of the risk(s) by enhancing existing defences or introducing new defences
- 2.9.3 GSP should involve the “end users” and subject matter experts in determining appropriate safety risk controls. A determination of any unintended consequences, particularly the introduction of new hazards, shall be made prior to the implementation of any safety risk controls.
- 2.9.4 Once the safety risk control has been agreed and implemented, the safety performance shall be monitored to assure its effectiveness.
- 2.9.5 The GSP shall ensure the implementation of a consistent and systematic approach, such as developing a hazard register to record identified hazards and how they are addressed, to document the process of safety risk assessment and mitigation.

## 2.10 Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement

- 2.10.1 Safety performance monitoring is conducted through the collection of safety data and safety information from a variety of sources typically available to an organisation. GSP shall develop and maintain such means to verify the safety performance of the organisation and validate the effectiveness of the safety risk controls.
- 2.10.2 The GSP shall perform internal audits to ensure regulatory compliance and proper implementation of its SMS and safety-related operations and processes to meet its desired level of safety performance.
- 2.10.3 The GSP shall establish lagging and leading SPIs relevant to its operations and safety objectives to measure and monitor its safety performance and validate the effectiveness of its safety risk control measures.
- 2.10.3.1 Lagging SPIs refer to indicators that measure events that have occurred and are “outcome-based”.
- 2.10.3.2 Leading SPIs refer to indicators that measure processes and inputs implemented to improve or maintain safety and are “activity- or process-based”.
- 2.10.4 GSP is encouraged to adopt SPIs that encompass a wide spectrum of indicators, including:
- a) low probability/high severity events (e.g., accidents and serious incidents);
  - b) high probability/low severity events (e.g., uneventful operational events, non-conformance reports, deviations, etc.);
  - c) process performance (e.g., training, system improvements and report processing).
- 2.10.5 The GSP should be able to demonstrate how the SPIs together with safety performance targets (SPTs) and safety triggers support the service provider in achieving its safety objectives and management’s decision-making. This could include developing new safety risk control measures to address deteriorating safety performance, or initiatives to achieve better safety performance.
- 2.10.5.1 Safety triggers are established levels or criteria values that initiate or trigger a service provider to evaluate or take safety actions to address its safety performance. Such triggers are usually set based on out-of-limits or threshold figures which if exceeded, would be deemed as unacceptable safety performance.
- 2.10.6 The GSP should conduct periodic audit or equivalent on its contractors, and evaluate amongst various elements, the safety performance of the contractors. This information should be used to feedback into the safety management system and operational manuals of the GSP.

## **2.11 Management of Change**

2.11.1 To manage changes and minimize any adverse impact they may have on aviation safety, a GSP is to establish a change management process. This process should include or incorporate processes for:

- a) identification of the types of event or triggers (internal and external to the GSP) that necessitates a formal change process;
- b) assessment of who and what will be affected by the change;
- c) hazards identification and risk assessment (HIRA) arising from the changes;
- d) development and proper implementation of an action plan to address the changes;
- e) sign off on the change by an individual or committee (The authority to make safety risk tolerability decisions should commensurate with one's general decision-making and resource allocation authority) that has the overall responsibility and authority for implementing the action plan;
- f) following through an assurance plan that ensures the necessary follow-up actions has been taken.

2.11.2 Change may affect the effectiveness of existing safety risk controls. In addition, new hazards and related safety risk may be inadvertently introduced into an operation when change occurs. Hazards shall be identified and related safety risk assessed and controlled as defined in the organisation's existing hazard identification or safety risk management procedures.

## **2.12 Continuous Improvement of SMS**

2.12.1 The GSP shall implement processes to continuously monitor and review the effectiveness of its SMS and where appropriate, identify areas for improvements. This may be done through activities such as internal audits, assessments, management reviews and evaluation of SPIs and SPTs.

2.12.2 The GSP should have processes to review and ensure continual improvement to the SMS throughout the organisation to include:

- a) identification of the cause(s) of substandard performance of the SMS;
- b) determination of the implications of substandard performance of the SMS in operations;
- c) elimination or mitigation of such cause(s) of substandard performance.

## **2.13 Training and Education**

2.13.1 GSP shall develop and implement a safety training programme for personnel at different levels and relevant functions in the organisation, including operational personnel, managers/supervisors, senior management and the Accountable Executive.

2.13.2 The training programme shall include initial and recurrent training requirements to maintain competencies. Initial safety training should consider as a minimum, the following:

- a) organisational safety policies and safety objectives;

- b) organisational roles and responsibilities related to safety;
- c) basic safety risk management principles;
- d) safety reporting systems;
- e) the organisation's SMS processes and procedures;
- f) human factors and human error.

Recurrent safety training should focus on changes to the SMS policies, processes and procedures, and should highlight any specific safety issues relevant to the organisation or lessons learned.

2.13.3 The scope of safety training should include elements of the organisation's SMS and be appropriate to an individual's involvement in the organisation's operations and SMS to ensure that he/she is trained and competent to perform the relevant SMS functions or duties. The safety training programme may be part of a larger training programme for the service provider's personnel.

2.13.4 There shall be specific training for the accountable executive, senior management, safety manager(s) and senior managers that includes the following topics:

- a) specific awareness training for new accountable executives and post holders on their SMS accountabilities and responsibilities;
- b) importance of compliance with national and organisational safety requirements;
- c) management commitment;
- d) allocation of resources;
- e) promotion of the safety policy and the SMS;
- f) promotion of a positive safety culture;
- g) effective interdepartmental safety communication;
- h) safety objective and SPIs;
- i) disciplinary policy;
- j) Safety risk assessment (i.e., management of safety reports, hazard identification, hazard analysis, safety risk assessment, safety mitigation, risk management and development of safety action plans);
- k) Safety assurance (i.e., development of SPI, safety performance monitoring and measurement and safety auditing methodologies and techniques).

## **2.14 Safety Communication**

2.14.1 GSP shall develop and maintain means of safety communication to disseminate safety-related information within and, where necessary, outside its organisation. Such information could include its safety objectives, SMS processes, safety-critical issues and safety lessons. The effectiveness of such means of communication should also be reviewed periodically to ensure that the intended audience received and understood the information.

2.14.2 GSP shall develop and maintain a formal mean for safety communication that:

- a) ensures personnel are aware of the SMS to a degree commensurate with their positions;
- b) conveys safety-critical information in a timely manner;



- c) explains why particular actions are taken to improve safety (e.g., new safety risk controls and corrective actions);
- d) explains why safety procedures are introduced or changed;
- e) promotes a positive safety culture and encourage personnel to identify and report hazards; and
- f) provides feedback to personnel submitting safety reports.

## **3 Human Factors**

### **3.1 Introduction to Human Factors**

3.1.1 Human factors is a science that pays attention to physical, psychological, and other human attributes to ensure that tasks are completed safely and efficiently with minimal risk to personnel and equipment. Most apron accidents and incidents involve, to a certain degree, human error or violation of company policies, processes or procedures. Examples of human factors for consideration are:

- a) Safety culture;
- b) Human performance limitations;
- c) Environmental considerations;
- d) Procedures, information, tools and task sign-off practices;
- e) Procedural non-compliance;
- f) Planning for tasks and equipment;
- g) Injury prevention;
- h) Fatigue/alertness management;
- i) Shift and task turnover;
- j) Error prevention strategies.

3.1.2 GSPs should incorporate human factors into their training, corrective actions and risk mitigation approaches.

## 4 Safety Culture

### 4.1 Introduction

- 4.1.1 Organisational safety culture sets the boundaries for acceptable behaviour in the workplace by establishing the behavioural norms and limits. These cultures provide the cornerstone for managerial and employee decision making.
- 4.1.2 Having a safety culture reflects senior management's commitment to safety. Senior management's attitude towards safety influences the employee's positive approach to safety and shared beliefs, practices and attitudes. The tone for safety culture is set and driven by the words and actions of senior management during implementation of a "Just Culture" process, which ensures fairness and open reporting in dealing with human error.
- 4.1.3 A positive safety culture demonstrates the following attributes:
- a) Senior management visibly demonstrates their commitment to their SMS;
  - b) Those in senior positions consistently foster a climate in which there is encouragement towards, comments and feedback from all levels of the organisation on safety matters;
  - c) There is an organisational policy regarding incident reporting (occupational and aviation safety) which encourages an open reporting culture where staff reports all safety events. There is a clear statement within the policy regarding management response to incidents, in particular whether it operates a just culture policy;
  - d) It provides a clear distinction between what are acceptable and unacceptable behaviours, and how people are treated accordingly;
  - e) There is a requirement to communicate safety information at all levels of the organisation. An effective communication infrastructure is developed and implemented;
  - f) There are policies and procedures documenting the identification of the hazards and assessment of risks associated with these hazards. These policies and procedures are made accessible to all staff;
  - g) Personnel are trained and understand the safety event reporting policy within their organisation;
  - h) Lessons learned from previous incidents are shared and included in training content to promote improvement of the safety programme;
  - i) An employee feedback system is established as part of the SMS.
- 4.1.4 GSPs should cultivate a safety culture as part of the SMS.

## **5 General Safety Guidelines**

### **5.1 General Ramp Safety**

#### **5.1.1 Engine Danger Areas**

- 5.1.1.1 Vehicles and personnel shall remain clear of aircraft danger areas when aircraft engines are running and/or the anti-collision lights are on.
- 5.1.1.2 In order to prevent incidents and accidents caused by aircraft engines, personnel shall never position themselves or their equipment in the following critical areas before or during aircraft departure and arrival:
  - a) Engine intake area
  - b) Engine blast area
  - c) Propeller rotation area, where applicable
- 5.1.1.3 Make sure the engine intake/propeller rotation area is clear at all times when engines are running, or when the engine start-up is about to begin.

#### **5.1.2 Fire Prevention and Protection**



- 5.1.2.1 All personnel shall not smoke at the airside except in designated smoking area(s) or have unauthorised open flames.
- 5.1.2.2 All personnel should be familiar with the location and use of firefighting equipment.
- 5.1.2.3 Do not refuel any GSE/equipment while the engine is running.
- 5.1.2.4 Do not use mobile devices while refuelling.
- 5.1.2.5 GSEs/vehicles should only be parked within defined equipment parking areas and in a manner that would not obstruct access to firefighting equipment and the fuel hydrant emergency shut-off valve.

GSPs should refer to the latest Fire Safety Manual (FSM) for further information on fire prevention and protection guidance.

### **5.2 Airside Locations**

#### **5.2.1 Equipment Restraint Area (ERA)**


- 5.2.1.1 The ERA is defined as the area of the apron bordered by a red line. It shall be kept clear at all times for the safe movement of an aircraft in and out of the stand. Personnel, vehicles and/or GSE are only allowed to enter when servicing the aircraft or for other work purposes. Drivers shall enter the ERA only when it is safe to do so. [Refer to Airside Driving Theory Handbook (ADTH) 4.8.6]



**Sample of Equipment Restraint Area**

## 5.2.2 Keep Clear Zone (KCZ) at the aircraft stands

- 5.2.2.1 The KCZ is marked with white hatched lines and “No Parking” signs painted on the ground.
- 5.2.2.2 During aircraft movement (including at the adjacent bay), the KCZ shall be kept clear of personnel, vehicles and/or GSE at all times.
- 5.2.2.3 For avoidance of doubt, personnel and vehicles, during flight handling, are allowed to enter the KCZ for manoeuvring only, and only if there is no aircraft movement (including at the adjacent bay).
- 5.2.2.4 Parking and staging are strictly prohibited at all times.




Sample of Keep Clear Zone (KCZ)

- 5.2.2.5 Personnel who are handling aircraft operations at the aircraft stand and adjacent stands shall perform pre-arrival and pre-departure FOD checks\* and remove any FOD from the “Keep Clear” zone.  
**\*Note: Refer to Section 5.7.6 – 5.7.7 for the conduct of FOD walk.**
- 5.2.2.6 The ADGS operator/manual marshaller (i.e. Arrival OIC) and headset man (Departure OIC) shall ensure that the ERA and the adjacent “Keep Clear” zones are clear of any obstruction prior to the arrival and pushback of aircraft.

### 5.2.3 Equipment Staging Area (ESA)

5.2.3.1 The ESA of an aircraft stand is demarcated by a continuous white line outlining the area where ground handling equipment or vehicles servicing the aircraft can be positioned at least 20 minutes before the arrival the aircraft. All vehicles shall be lined up in an orderly manner at all times. All ground handling equipment or vehicles shall be removed from the ESA and returned to the designated parking area after aircraft servicing.



Sample of Equipment Staging Area

### 5.2.4 Passenger Loading Bridge (PLB) Safety Zone



Sample of PLB Safety Zone

5.2.4.1 The PLB safety zone is demarcated by the red hatched area. Airside drivers operating in the aircraft stand should observe the following:

- Keep clear of the PLB safety zone at all times;
- After PLB has docked to aircraft, only vehicles and equipment authorised by CAG may be positioned in the PLB safety zone;


- c) Alert the PLB operator if there is any obstruction in the PLB safety zone before PLB operations begin.

5.2.4.2 No entry into the PLB safety zone when PLB is in operations.

### 5.2.5 ERA and ESA of Multiple Aircraft Receiving Stand (MARS) Layout


5.2.5.1 A MARS can accommodate either 1 Code E/F aircraft or 2 Code C aircraft at any one time.

5.2.5.2 There are 3 sets of ERAs and lead-in lines marked on the apron for each MARS. The main ERA encompasses the whole parking stand for a Code E/F aircraft. The left and right ERAs are smaller and are demarcated within the main ERA. They can accommodate one Code C aircraft each.



Sample illustration of MARS layout with a parked Code E aircraft






**Sample illustration of MARS Layout with two parked Code C aircraft & KCZ markings covering area in-between**

5.2.5.3 The area between the Left and Right Code C ERAs is a KCZ and must be kept clear when there is an aircraft entering or exiting either Code C ERA of the MARS. The procedures for KCZ as detailed in section 5.2.2 will apply when the MARS bay is used for Code C aircraft. In particular:

- a) The KCZ between the two Code C aircraft stands in the MARS are to be kept clear when there is an aircraft entering or exiting either Code C aircraft stand. No parking and/or staging of vehicles and equipment is allowed.
- b) Before any aircraft enters or exits the Code C aircraft stand of the MARS, the responsible party (RP) shall conduct the FOD walk for the Code C aircraft stand (outlined in dashed red line) and any adjacent KCZ, including the KCZ between the two Code C aircraft stands.
- c) During Code E/F aircraft operations at the MARS aircraft stand, the Code C related markings would not be applicable (i.e. dashed red ERA boundary and the KCZ markings between the two Code C aircraft stands).


5.2.5.4 There are 3 sets of ESA within a MARS.

5.2.5.5 The original ESA remains the same in size, however markings for designated equipment has been removed.




**Sample of ESA for Code "E"**

5.2.5.6 For the right and left parking stands, the respective ESAs (R-ESA and L-ESA) are located next to each other at the top right corner of the stand, separated by a service road.



**Sample of R-ESA and L-ESA for Code "C" aircraft**

5.2.5.7 For equipment servicing the left stand, they are to access the left through moving behind the aircraft parked in the right stand.



**Sample showing the flow of GSE from L- ESA to L- ERA and R-ESA to R-ERA**

**Note: Refer to Annex VI and VII for MARS layout and its PLB wheels position.**

### 5.3 Operating Vehicles and Ground Support Equipment at The Apron

#### 5.3.1 Airfield Driving Permit (ADP) & Airfield Vehicle Permit (AVP)

- 5.3.1.1 For all Airfield Driving Permit (ADP) and Airfield Vehicle Permit (AVP) matters, please refer to CAG ADTH and consult Airside Driving Centre.

#### 5.3.2 Safe driving and parking of ground support equipment inside ERA

- 5.3.2.1 The following precautions shall be observed before entering the ERA for aircraft servicing:

- d) Aircraft is at a complete stop;
- e) Engines are switched off and spooling down;
- f) Anti-collision lights are switched off;
- g) Wheel chocks are positioned;
- h) Grounding cables are connected on the nose and main landing gears;
- i) Ground / Flight crew communication is established, and headset man gives the 'thumbs up' signal.

**Note: The above does not apply for GPU connection during aircraft arrival when aircraft's APU is inoperable. The GPU should be positioned on the right-hand side of the nose wheel parallel to the aircraft centerline.**

- 5.3.2.2 When operating GSE in the ERA:

- a) Do not approach the aircraft until all safety cones have been placed;
- b) Do not drive GSE faster than walking speed;
- c) Do not operate vehicles or equipment while using hand-held PEDs (e.g. cell phone, laptops and tablets);
- d) Do not carry extra personnel during GSE movement unless that person is seated in a passenger seat provided in the vehicle or standing in a section of the vehicle which has been constructed for standing passengers;
- e) Do not drive the GSE across the path of embarking and disembarking passengers. Aircraft passengers always have right of way;
- f) Ensure a free passage is maintained. If a fuel bowser is used, it is to be removed speedily. For hydrant dispensers, a clear exit path should be maintained, and it is to be removed speedily as well;
- g) Drivers shall not drive over fuel hydrant pits, any hose or bonding cable used for refuelling of aircraft;
- h) No GSE shall be driven or positioned under the aircraft fuselage and/or wings unless specifically required, e.g., hydrant dispenser, defueling truck, water servicing truck, lavatory servicing truck, and towbarless tractor;

**Note: Refer to CAAS By-Law No.11**

- i) Loading equipment shall remain in position while personnel are still in the cargo hold, while ensuring that a safety distance is constantly maintained between the GSE and the aircraft;
- j) Do not leave any vehicle unattended with its engine running;

- k) Do not drive GSE with lifting devices in the raised positions, except for final positioning of the GSE onto the aircraft;
- l) Use a guide person when reversing GSE to the aircraft;
- m) After positioning on the aircraft, raise all safety rails on conveyor belts, loaders and other elevated devices;
- n) Make a minimum of one complete stop with all motorized vehicles / equipment prior to entering the ERA;
  - i. Conduct a “Brake Check” or “Safety Stop” by coming to a full and complete stop to confirm the serviceability of the brake system on the vehicle and to test the apron surface. This action shall be carried out even if there is no ERA marked on the apron;
  - ii. This stop shall be conducted at a distance no less than 5 metres from the aircraft.
- o) Manoeuvre GSE carefully to prevent personnel injury and / or aircraft damage;
- p) When reversing vehicles or equipment with limited rear-view visibility inside the ERA:
  - i. Be guided by an agent using standard IATA signals, and / or;
  - ii. Be assisted by means of a rear-view video or mirror.

**Note: Marshaller must position himself to the obstacle and maintain the line of sight with the driver.**

### 5.3.3 Unserviceable GSEs

- 5.3.3.1 In the event of a breakdown of a GSE in movement areas such as **taxiways, taxilanes, Equipment Restraint Area (ERA), Keep Clear Zone (KCZ) or any other operational areas**, drivers are to be aware of the breakdown reporting procedures:
- a) Call CAG Airside Management Centre (AMC) at 6541 2275 to report breakdown. If vehicle is in the Manoeuvring Area (e.g. taxiway), driver should also inform ATC immediately;
  - b) Call company to have the equipment / vehicle removed immediately;
  - c) While waiting for removal, driver shall also observe the following:
    - a. Move the equipment / vehicle out of the movement areas where possible
    - b. Remain in a safe place while waiting for removal. Do not leave the vehicle unattended.

### 5.3.4 Treatment of Unserviceable GSEs

- 5.3.4.1 The GSP shall ensure that unserviceable GSE is removed from operations for repair and/or maintenance. The unserviceable GSE shall be indicated with out of service markers to ensure it is not being used for operations.

### 5.3.5 Mandatory deployment of wheel chocks/stabilisers on motorised ground support equipment

5.3.5.1 Correct deployment of wheel chocks/stabilisers on motorised GSE can prevent inadvertent rolling forward/backward of equipment, or when in-built braking mechanism malfunctions.

5.3.5.2 The following motorised GSEs shall at all times, be deployed with wheel chocks/stabilisers when docked onto the aircraft or when parked in the airside:

- a) Air-conditioning unit (including towable unit);
- b) Air starter unit;
- c) Air-tugs;
- d) Ballymore;
- e) Belt loader (including towable belt loader);
- f) Fuel truck / Hydrant dispenser;
- g) Ground power unit;
- h) Hi-lift / Ambulift;
- i) Lavatory truck;
- j) Lower deck loader;
- k) Main deck loader;
- l) Passenger stairs (including towable passenger stairs);
- m) Tractor;
- n) Transporter;
- o) Water truck.

5.3.5.3 Wheel chocks are to be used in pairs, positioned firmly and squarely against the centre of the tyre. Improper positioning may reduce the effectiveness of the wheel chocks.



**Sample of proper wheel chock placement**

### 5.3.6 Action when vehicle catches fire

5.3.6.1 If possible, the operator should first attempt to move the vehicle away from the aircraft and building. The operator shall then carry out the following:

- a) Turn off engine;
- b) Switch off master switch if applicable;
- c) Get the passenger and himself out of the vehicle;
- d) Attempt to put out the fire with the fire extinguisher on board without endangering oneself;
- e) Inform AES via 65412525;

- f) Stay away from the vehicle and direct traffic away;
- g) Where possible, move adjacent GSEs/vehicles away to avoid the fire from spreading.

## 5.4 General Conduct of Ramp Personnel

### 5.4.1 High visibility safety vest & raincoat specifications

- 5.4.1.1 This paragraph shall be read in conjunction with CAAS By-Law 43: Safety vest and raincoat.
- 5.4.1.2 CAAS By-Law No 43(3) states that a high visibility vest shall be of a type approved by the airport licensee and shall comply with such requirements as the airport licensee may from time to time specify.
- 5.4.1.3 CAAS By-Law No 43(5) states that a high visibility raincoat or rain suit shall be of a type approved by the airport licensee and shall comply with such requirements as the airport licensee may from time to time specify.
- 5.4.1.4 Every person shall wear a high visibility safety vest, safety shoes and be equipped with earplugs when performing aircraft handling activities. Refer to AHM 462 for list of appropriate PPE.
- 5.4.1.5 The specifications for the vest are:
  - a) Basic colour must be bright;
  - b) Yellow, orange and lime green are recommended;
  - c) Meets a minimum of Class 2 of the EN ISO 20471:2013 which requires a minimum of 0.5m<sup>2</sup> fluorescent material and 0.13 m<sup>2</sup> reflective surfaces;
  - d) Be imprinted with the company's logo for easy identification.



**Example of Class 2 high visibility safety vest**

**Note: If the company uniform incorporates the safety vest requirements, the safety vest will not be required. However, the safety vest shall be worn if the uniform no longer meets the minimum requirements stipulated above.**



#### Example of uniform with high visibility safety vest requirements

- e) The high visibility raincoat or rain suit shall meet the following specifications:
  - i. The raincoat or rain suit shall meet a minimum of **Class 3** of the new **EN ISO 20471:2013** which requires a minimum of 0.8m<sup>2</sup> fluorescent surface and 0.2m<sup>2</sup> reflective surfaces.
  - ii. It shall cover the torso and have minimally either sleeves with retro-reflective bands or full-length trouser legs with retro-reflective bands.



#### Example of Class 3 high visibility raincoat

- f) If the raincoat or rain suit does not meet the above requirement, a Class 2 high visibility safety vest shall be worn over the raincoat or rain suit.

### 5.4.2 Requirements for accessories worn

- 5.4.2.1 Neckties or other loose hanging accessories which may pose risk, shall be of the quick release type (clip)
- 5.4.2.2 Personnel working with an around vehicles and equipment must protect themselves from loose clothing, long hair and/or hanging accessories/jewellery from becoming a hazard, e.g., caught or trapped in equipment.

### 5.4.3 Airside rules

- 5.4.3.1 The following airside rules shall be adhered to:
  - a) Do not smoke, except at designated areas;
  - b) Follow established procedures (i.e. no horseplay);
  - c) Do not walk between ULDs or trailers;
  - d) Do not abuse GSE and to use GSE only for its intended purpose;
  - e) Do not tow another GSE unless a suitable tow bar is used for that purpose;
  - f) Observe the danger areas / hazards on the ramp and take the necessary precautions for personnel and aircraft safety;
  - g) Ensure the ground below the PLB emergency stairs is kept clear of all obstructions;

- h) Do not litter or leave any refuse or FOD within the aircraft stand;
- i) Do not consume any food or beverage and do not feed any birds or animals;
- j) Do not use PEDs (e.g. cell phone, laptops and tablets) within 3 metres of FSZ when refuelling is in progress unless such device is intrinsically-safe certified;
- k) Do not walk over the refuelling hose.

**Note: During aircraft refueling, fuel is pumped into the aircraft fuel tanks, expelling fuel vapour from the tanks through each wing vent. This vapour mixes with the surrounding air and forms a flammable environment. Introducing equipment which can produce spark risks can cause ignition of the vapour and flash fire that could burn people, the aircraft and equipment.**

#### 5.4.4 Reporting requirement

- 5.4.4.1 All incidents shall be reported to CAG AMC immediately\* (see also section 5.3.3.1 on Breakdown of GSE in movement areas);
- 5.4.4.2 All aircraft-related incidents shall be reported to CAG AMC immediately\*. Examples of reportable aircraft-related incidents include (but not limited to):
  - a) Unintended contact of tools, equipment or cargo with aircraft exterior and interior;
  - b) Damage to aircraft exterior and cargo hold;
  - c) Damage discovered on aircraft exterior and cargo hold;
  - d) Abnormal operations during aircraft handling.
- 5.4.4.3 Where damage has been found or where contact has taken place or is suspected to have taken place, do not move any GSE to/from the aircraft in the area where damage has been found until inspection is completed and clearance given to proceed, but without:
  - a. Affecting life-saving/rescue operations;
  - b. Causing further property damages; and
  - c. Endangering other operations.
- 5.4.4.4 For any aircraft fuel spillage, please contact AMC immediately. Refer to the CAG FSM Chapter 9, on the reporting requirements for aircraft fuel spillages;
- 5.4.4.5 For hydraulic spillages, please contact CAG AMC immediately

**\*Note: Notification to CAG AMC shall be no later than two (2) hours from being made aware of the incident unless there are extenuating circumstances.**



## 5.5 Adverse Weather Conditions

### 5.5.1 Storm and lightning

- 5.5.1.1 Take extra care when walking or driving due to possible slippery apron surface.
- 5.5.1.2 Operators should wear a high visibility raincoat.
- 5.5.1.3 Personnel performing ground to flight deck communications shall use the wireless headset at all times
- 5.5.1.4 3-point grounding is a means of lightning protection for all personnel servicing the aircraft. Personnel shall ensure that the aircraft is grounded at 3 points at all times when the aircraft is parked at the aircraft stand.
- 5.5.1.5 3-point grounding is applicable to all aircraft types.

**Note: Boeing 737 only has 2 designated ground points. 2-point aircraft grounding shall be conducted when handling the Boeing 737 aircraft.**

### 5.5.2 Strong wind conditions

- 5.5.2.1 Airside Personnel shall ensure the following at all times. These are also mitigation actions in strong wind conditions:
  - a) Aircraft landing gears are chocked;
  - b) All GSEs are properly secured;
    - i. Parking brakes are set on all parked GSE;
    - ii. Wheel chocks/stabilisers are deployed for GSE when docked onto aircraft or parked;
    - iii. Stabilisers of maintenance steps are fully engaged;
    - iv. Wheel chocks and securing chains are used when available;
    - v. Empty ULDs are secured;
  - c) All loose items such as cleaning tools are kept;
  - d) Equipment not required for the servicing of the aircraft are removed from the ERA;
  - e) Bypass pin is inserted only when aircraft is ready for pushback and/or towing operations;
  - f) Extreme care is taken when opening or closing aircraft doors.

**Note: Upon receiving the strong wind alert, which is disseminated via SWEET to the GSPs, operators shall conduct a round of check to ensure that the standard precautions are being taken.**

### 5.5.3 Low visibility

- 5.5.3.1 During low visibility conditions, personnel shall ensure:
  - a) Vehicle headlights are switched on;
  - b) Second level floodlights are switched on (if required);
  - c) Cautious driving.

## **5.6 Use of Aircraft Wheel Chocks and Safety Cones**

### **5.6.1 Use of aircraft wheel chocks**

5.6.1.1 Sufficient numbers of serviceable chocks shall be provided for the arrival aircraft, considering the ramp and / or weather conditions.

5.6.1.2 Do not approach the aircraft until:

- a) Aircraft is at a complete stop;
- b) Engines are switched off and spooling down;
- c) Anti-collision lights are switched off.

### **5.6.2 Placement of wheel chocks**

5.6.2.1 Chocks shall be placed in accordance with airline requirements:

- a) Walk towards the main gear in the path parallel to the fuselage, avoiding engine intake areas;
- b) Remove any temporarily-placed nose gear chocks, if applicable;
- c) When placing chocks, stand well clear of the path of the tyres. Approach/leave the main landing gear from the front or rear;
- d) Notify the flight deck when the chocks are placed.

### **5.6.3 Removal of wheel chocks**

5.6.3.1 Remove chocks together with grounding cables after all the following have been completed:

- a) All loading GSEs and PLB have been disconnected from the aircraft;
- b) Airtug is connected to the aircraft;
- c) Airtug parking brake is engaged;
- d) Aircraft parking brake is engaged.

**Note: Start the disconnection of the grounding cables from the aircraft grounding point before proceeding to the earth receptacle point.**

**Note: Grounding cable and chocks at nose landing gear may be removed earlier to facilitate the connection of towbar-less airtug.**

5.6.3.2 When not in use, all unused chocks shall be removed from the aircraft stand and stowed away in their designated stowage areas.

#### 5.6.4 Use of safety cones

5.6.4.1 Safety cones are a caution indicator for operators to maintain a safety distance from certain parts of the aircraft to prevent collision by GSE.

5.6.4.2 Safety cones shall be orange in colour with reflective stripes. Cones shall not be used if it does not serve its intended purpose.

5.6.4.3 Prior to arrival of the aircraft, there shall be sufficient serviceable safety cones for the aircraft type to be handled.

#### 5.6.5 Placement of safety cones


5.6.5.1 Do not approach the aircraft until:

- a) Aircraft is at a complete stop;
- b) Engines are switched off and spooling down;
- c) Anti-collision lights are switched off;
- d) Wheel chocks are positioned;
- e) Grounding cables are connected on the nose and main landing gears;
- f) Ground / Flight crew communication is established, and headset man gives the 'thumbs up' signal.

**Note: GSE to approach aircraft when safety cones are in position.**


5.6.5.2 Cone placement should be done to maintain a safety buffer to the aircraft in accordance with the airlines' requirement or as recommended by IATA (IGOM Chapter 4.3), shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 – within a maximum of 1 metre outward from the point of the aircraft being protected. It is permissible to place the cones in the Keep Clear Zone (KCZ) if the wingtip of the parked aircraft is on the ERA boundary line.

5.6.5.3 It is mandatory to place a safety cone under the tail of aircraft upon aircraft arrival (after thumbs-up) along with other current safety cones as recommended by IATA or as required by airlines.



CONE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
1	Cones max. 1 m (3 ft) in front of engine
2	Cones max. 1 m (3 ft) from wingtip
3	Additional cones to be placed at the applicable end(s) of the aircraft where immediately adjacent to a service road.

**Figure 1: Cone Placement for Wing-Mounted Twin Engine Jet Aircraft.**



CONE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
①	Cones max. 1 m (3 ft) in front of engine
②	Cones max. 1 m (3 ft) from wingtip
③	Additional cones to be placed at the applicable end(s) of the aircraft where immediately adjacent to a service road, and always on aircraft with low ground clearance (e.g. BAe-146, Avro RJ-85/100).

**Figure 2: Cone Placement for Wing-Mounted Four Engine Jet Aircraft (to insert tail cone)**

### 5.6.6 Removal of safety cones

- a) Do not remove until GSE and vehicular activities around the aircraft have ceased prior to departure of the aircraft (excluding the PLB);
- b) When not in use, the safety cones shall be placed at the designated storage area.

## 5.7 Foreign Object Debris

### 5.7.1 General term for FOD

- 5.7.1.1 Foreign Object Debris (FOD) is a general term which applies to all loose objects which endanger the safety of aircraft and therefore must not be left in any area where they would pose a hazard.
- 5.7.1.2 Every individual has a responsibility to ensure that the risk of damage to aircraft from FOD is minimized.
- 5.7.1.3 All FOD must be removed and properly disposed of as soon as it is discovered.
- 5.7.1.4 The presence of FOD is often due to the failure of personnel to perform checks, pick up FOD, or appropriately disposing waste from the airside. FOD are commonly left in aircraft movement areas by airside personnel or blown to aircraft movement areas from other airside areas.



**Example of FOD found in the airside**

### **Example of Typical FOD commonly found at the aircraft stand areas**

**Maintenance FOD** - this relates to objects, such as tools, materials or parts that are used for aircraft maintenance activities. Presently aircraft maintenance activities are being performed at the aircraft stand which require a variety of objects, such as rivets, washers, safety wire, nuts and bolts and rags that can become FOD if they are inadvertently left behind.

**Other typical FOD found at an aircraft stand** such as apron items (paper and plastic debris from catering and freight pallets, luggage parts (such as locks and zippers), cargo loads that may have fallen off their containers, debris and rubber chips from ramp equipment), concrete and asphalt chunks, rubber joint materials, paint chips, pieces of wood, fasteners and miscellaneous metal objects and plastic and/or polyethylene materials.

- 5.7.1.5 Equipment operators are responsible for the FOD hazards found on the equipment that they are operating or towing. They shall conduct the necessary checks and ensure that the equipment is clear of FOD before operating it.
- 5.7.1.6 All personnel are responsible for removing FOD. “If you see it (FOD), remove it”. FOD found at the aircraft stand shall be properly disposed of in the FOD bin provided at the aircraft stand.



**FOD bins at the aircraft stands**

## 5.7.2 Consequences of FOD

- 5.7.2.1 Foreign object debris may be ingested into aircraft engines, causing damage to critical engine parts. This is especially hazardous if it occurs in flight, particularly during the take-off phase.
- 5.7.2.2 In addition, FOD can cause damage to the tyres, undercarriage, control systems and other parts of the airframe. All such damage could lead to inflight failures.
- 5.7.2.3 Items such as rags and wireless headset unit, associated with engineering and servicing of aircraft, have been left in wheel bays and other ledges where they can subsequently fall out during take-off phase and create a hazard to subsequent aircraft landing or taking off on the runway.
- 5.7.2.4 Failure to maintain ground support equipment (i.e. where parts break off or fall out can also contribute to FOD) can likely cause damage to an aircraft particularly when its wheels run over it or when it is ingested into the engine.
- 5.7.2.5 FOD can also become a trip hazard for personnel working on or around the aircraft.

## 5.7.3 CAG FOD management policy

- 5.7.3.1 FOD prevention is the duty and responsibility of everyone working in the airside in Changi Airport. This policy applies to all staff and airside agencies at Changi Airport. All airside personnel need to be aware about the hazards of FOD and play a proactive role to ensure that these FOD hazards are removed or mitigated. If these hazards are unable to be rectified, airside personnel are to inform CAG AMC.
- 5.7.3.2 All airside partners and personnel are responsible for managing waste generated by their operations and ensure that the airside areas are clean before leaving.
- 5.7.3.3 If anyone witnesses any FOD safety risks, please report them to CAG AMC.

## 5.7.4 Responsible Parties for FOD walks at stands

- 5.7.4.1 The Responsible Parties (RP) to conduct the FOD checks in different aircraft movement scenarios mentioned in section 5.7.6 - 5.7.10 are defined as follow:

	Type of Aircraft Movement	Responsible Party
<b>a)</b>	Live Arrival	ADGS Operator / Manual Marshaller
	Towing-in Aircraft	Flight-in-Charge (FIC) or equivalent
<b>b)</b>	Live Departure and towing-out aircraft	Headset man

**Note: The RP for live arrivals and live departures is also known as Arrival OIC and Departure OIC respectively in Chapter 6.**




## 5.7.5 FOD Checks before live aircraft arrival or towing-in aircraft arriving into the stand

5.7.5.1 Prior to any live aircraft arrival or towing-in into the stand, the RP shall be adequately equipped (proper PPE with no loose items at all times) and ensure that an FOD walk is conducted. The FOD walk shall cover the ERA and KCZ comprehensively. A torchlight shall be used to assist in the FOD checks during hours of darkness.

5.7.5.2 The diagram below illustrates an FOD walk path prior to the arrival of an aircraft of a typical aircraft stand.


**FOD walk path at a typical aircraft stand prior to the arrival of an aircraft**



- 5.7.5.3 The RP shall walk the path around the entire boundary of the ERA to ensure that this area, **including the Keep Clear Zones (KCZ)** are free of equipment, personnel, FOD and spillage. Arrival OIC shall also walk along the boundary line to ensure no equipment is encroaching into the ERA. (See **black** footprints in the above diagram and with reference to 5.7.6.5). Cones used to maintain a safety buffer to the parked aircraft is permissible to be in the KCZ.
- 5.7.5.4 The RP shall also walk the path along the centreline of the aircraft stand to look out for any FOD that could cause damage to aircraft engines or tyres. The RP shall ensure that the path and area that the aircraft will be moving into is free of FOD. (See **blue** footprints in the above diagram)
- 5.7.5.5 The RP is to look out for aircraft movement at the adjacent aircraft stands when carrying out pre-arrival FOD check of the KCZs. If at the adjacent stand, an aircraft is about to pushback or if there is an arrival aircraft about to taxi in, the RP is to go back to the stand limit line and wait until the aircraft has completed its pushback or has come to a complete stop. He then can resume his FOD check of the KCZs. For MARS Code C operations, the FOD check shall include the KCZ between the two Code C aircraft stands.

**Note: Refer to Section 5.2.5.3 - Procedures for KCZ when MARS bay is used for Code C aircraft.**

- 5.7.5.6 For aircraft stands such as A5, A9, B5 and B6 where the lead-in lines cut across a large KCZ, the RP shall walk the path along the lead-in line up to the apron boundary line and cover the KCZ comprehensively to look out for FOD.




## 5.7.6 FOD Checks before live aircraft departure or aircraft towing-out from the stand


5.7.6.1 Prior to any live aircraft departure or towing-out from the stand, the RP shall be adequately equipped (proper PPE with no loose items at all times) and ensure that a FOD walk is conducted. The FOD walk shall cover the ERA and KCZ comprehensively. A torchlight shall be used to assist in the FOD checks during hours of darkness.

5.7.6.2 The diagram below illustrates an FOD walk path prior to the pushback of an aircraft at a typical aircraft stand.

### FOD walk path at a typical aircraft stand prior to the pushback of an aircraft



- 5.7.6.3 The RP shall walk around the entire aircraft to ensure that there is no equipment, spillage, FOD and personnel within the ERA, including the KCZs. Such inspections are crucial as they enable the GHAs to identify and eliminate unsafe conditions and prevent an FOD incident. (See **black** footprints in the above diagram and with reference to 5.7.6.5). Cones used to maintain a safety buffer to the parked aircraft is permissible to be in the KCZ.
- 5.7.6.4 The RP shall also ensure that the path and area that the aircraft tyres would move over during pushback phase, is free of FOD. The RP must look out for any FOD that could cause damage to aircraft engines and tyres. (See **blue** footprints in the above diagram)
- 5.7.6.5 For aircraft stands such as A5, A9, B5 and B6 where the pushback lines cut across a larger KCZ, the RP shall walk the path along the pushback line up to the apron boundary line and cover the KCZ comprehensively to look out for FOD.



- 5.7.6.6 Any FOD found at the aircraft stand shall be properly disposed in the yellow FOD bin provided at every aircraft stand. Personnel shall also:
  - a) Conduct routine checks on ground equipment and
  - b) In ramp areas ensure that anything carried in or on a vehicle is secured. Items such as safety cones and/or wheel chocks should not be left unsecured on GSEs when in operations.



## Example of wheel chock left unsecured on airtug

### 5.7.7 Engine start

5.7.7.1 Qualified personnel should complete a final examination of the aircraft before engine starts, in particular to confirm:

- a) Surface condition of the apron is adequate to conduct operations; and
- b) Apron is clear of FOD.

5.7.7.2 If an Air Start Unit (ASU) is required, check that the equipment is suitable for the operation and correctly positioned.

5.7.7.3 When starting up with an Air Start Unit (ASU),

- a) Only personnel and equipment involved in engine starting or aircraft pushback are permitted within the ERA during engine start;
- b) All personnel and equipment shall remain clear of engine danger areas;
- c) Communicate with the flight crew and confirm the total number of engines to be started, the engine start sequence to be used, the number of ASUs being used and their positioning;
- d) Advise the engine start sequence to the ASU operator(s) and any other ground staff;
- e) Where possible, the ASU should be positioned on the opposite side of the aircraft to the engine being started;
- f) The ASU shall be positioned in accordance with the following to prevent damage to the aircraft and personal injury;
  - i. It will not hamper other ramp operations, such as loading and fuelling.
  - ii. It is parked outside the engine danger areas.
  - iii. The ASU towbar is directed away from the aircraft and not to be connected to the tractor when connected to the aircraft.
  - iv. It could be easily removed after engine start-up, avoiding the engine danger areas.
  - v. The exhaust pipe of the unit is directed away from the aircraft fuselage and wing.
- g) When connecting the air supply hose to the aircraft, ensure that:
  - i. The air supply hose is laid in such a way as to avoid any twists that could affect the air flow.
  - ii. The aircraft receptacle is free from FOD or any fluid.
  - iii. Ensure that the air supply hose coupling is firmly attached to the aircraft connector and pressurize the ASU after consulting the flight crew.

*Caution: If the ASU is positioned within an engine danger area, ensure that the engine will only be started after disconnection/removal of the ASU.*

#### 5.7.7.4 Communication during engine / tailpipe / exhaust fire

- a) Ground staff shall communicate with flight crew immediately via headset and/or appropriate "FIRE" hand signal. Do not attempt to fight the fire with fire extinguishers on ground. Flight crew will take all necessary actions.
- b) Call AES hotline at 6541 2525.

#### 5.7.8 Actions by Airline's Agent during refuelling with passengers on board

- 5.7.8.1 Personnel shall ensure the escape routes of passengers on board such as passenger stairs and bridges are clear of FOD.



Example of escape route to be kept clear of FOD

#### 5.7.9 What to do when carrying out regular activities at the airside

- 5.7.9.1 Remove all items (including trash) generated from aircraft servicing from the aircraft stand immediately.
- 5.7.9.2 Always return all equipment to their designated positions after use. These include safety cones, safety pole, trolley, aircraft wheel chocks, aircraft grounding cables and fire extinguishers.
- 5.7.9.3 Do not leave any personal belongings unattended anywhere, especially on the plinth area. Ensure that personal belongings carried on the person are well kept and secured and do not fall off onto airside areas.



Example of plinth area to be kept clean of FOD and equipment returned to their designated position

## 6 Standard Operating Procedures

### 6.1 Introduction

- 6.1.1 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are the foundation of effective personnel coordination and a key component in team resource management and threat and error management.
- 6.1.2 GSPs shall establish and maintain SOPs for their various operations accordingly, and to ensure that they can be carried out effectively and safely.
- 6.1.3 GSPs' SOPs shall be aligned to the operating procedures and requirements stated throughout the GOSM.
- 6.1.4 GSPs shall ensure that all personnel are trained in the relevant SOPs to maintain a standardised level of currency.
- 6.1.5 The SOPs shall be reviewed whenever there is a change to the operation.

### 6.2 Standardised Ramp Handling Procedure for Aircraft Arrival and Departure

- 6.2.1 The standardised arrival and departure handling procedure was developed in collaboration with the Changi airside community. This standardised procedure seeks to improve ground operational safety by specifying the minimum standard operating requirements for ramp handling, and to reduce the complexity of ground handling operation by harmonising multiple stakeholders performing ground handling functions on the same aircraft.

### 6.3 Arrival OIC Roles and Responsibilities

- 6.3.1 The ADGS operator/ manual marshaller is the overall-in-charge for arrival phase of ground handling (Arrival OIC). He is empowered to point out any violation which could compromise safety and demand for violation to be corrected.


**Note: The Arrival OIC shall contact AMC if operators do not comply with safety procedures.**

- 6.3.2 The key safety responsibilities of the Arrival OIC include the followings:
  - a) Ensure that the ERA and the adjacent KCZ are free of FOD, equipment and/or spillage (cones used to maintain a safety buffer to the parked aircraft is permissible to be in the KCZ);
  - b) Ensure that the PLB is fully retracted in its "parked position" or "pre-position" (Refer to Annex VIII: Exceptions to PLB wheel positions);
  - c) Ensure all ground service equipment (GSE) and personnel are positioned outside of the ERA and the adjacent KCZs prior to aircraft arrival;
  - d) Ensure that the ADGS is serviceable and displays the correct aircraft type and variant;
  - e) Ensure all GSE and personnel stay clear of the ERA and adjacent KCZs until the nose wheels have been chocked, aircraft has been grounded, anti-collision lights have been switched off and thumbs-up has been given. (Refer to wheel chocking placement for various aircraft type in accordance with IATA IGOM).

### 6.3.3 Details of the Standardised Arrival Procedure

6.3.3.1 The Arrival OIC is to ensure that the following duties are carried out safely by the respective personnel.

#### 6.3.3.2 Pre-Arrival

Step	Action by	Duties
1	ADGS operator	Conduct a FOD walk in accordance to para 5.7.6.3. Please note that para 5.7.6 shall be read in conjunction.
2	ADGS Operator	Ensure that maintenance step is available for marshalling in case of ADGS failure (if applicable).
3	ADGS Operator	Check that there are sufficient numbers of serviceable chocks, grounding cables, safety cones and pole.
4	ADGS Operator	Passenger Loading Bridge (PLB) wheels must be in the designated parking boxes. <b>See Annex VIII, Part (1) for exception cases</b>
6	ADGS Operator	Test for ADGS serviceability. Refer to the instructions attached in the ADGS panel
7	ADGS operator	Conduct a FOD walk in accordance to para 5.7.6
8	ADGS Operator	Place two safety cones with a safety pole on them at the front of the ERA at no earlier than 5 minutes before ETA and no later than the activation of ADGS.  
9	ADGS operator	Following the placement of safety cones and pole, the ADGS operator is to maintain an active lookout for equipment entering the ERA / KCZ. In the event of



		equipment entering the ERA / KCZ, the Arrival OIC shall perform a FOD check along the path that the equipment travelled.
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6.3.3.3 Normal Arrival (APU serviceable)

Step	Action by	Duties
1	ADGS Operator	Ensure aircraft stops at correct stopline. Maintain visual focus on the aircraft stand and depress e-stop button if operator is unsure or identifies an imminent danger.
2	Headset Man/ Chock Bearer	<p>Enter only after engines are switched off and spooling down, and anti-collision lights are switched off. Approach aircraft from the nose landing gear in a path parallel to the fuselage, avoiding engine intake areas.</p> <p>In the event any of the following occurs,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Aircraft's anti-collision lights not switched off after one minute;</li> <li>b. Aircraft's engine(s) not turned off after one minute;</li> <li>c. Tailpipe fire observed,</li> </ul> <p>the Headset Man and chock bearer may enter the ERA and approach the aircraft's nose landing gear in a path parallel to the fuselage, avoiding engine intake areas, to establish communications with the pilot(s). Both parties shall stay near the nose landing gear. The chock bearer shall only place chocks at the nose landing gear and may only proceed to the main landing gears after the Headset Man has informed him it is safe to do so.</p>
3	Chock Bearer	<p>Chock aircraft:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Nose gear: Maintain approximately 2-inch gap for forward and aft wheels (as appropriate).</li> </ul>

		b) Main gear: Maintain approximately 2-inch gap for forward wheels. No gap for aft wheels (as appropriate).
4	Headset Man	Connect one end of the grounding cable to the earth receptacle on the ground, before connecting the other end to the aircraft nose landing gear (if applicable).
5	Chock Bearer	Connect one end of grounding cable to the earth receptacle on the ground before connecting the other end to the aircraft main landing gears.
6	Headset Man	Establish communications and notify flight crew “chocks in place”.
7	Headset Man	Provide “thumbs-up” signal clearance for personnel and PLB operator. GSE to approach aircraft after safety cones are in position. Refer to para 9.2.2(d)
8	Operators	Check for damage on the cabin/cargo door and surrounding area before docking GSEs and PLB.

#### 6.3.3.4 Arrival (APU inoperative)

Step	Action by	Duties
1	ADGS Operator	Ensure aircraft stops at correct stopline. Maintain visual focus on the aircraft stand and depress e-stop button if operator is unsure or identifies an imminent danger.
2	Headset Man	Approach aircraft from front of nose gear to establish communication with flight crew. a) Confirm APU inoperative; b) Remind flight crew parking brakes must be set and anti-collision lights must remain on.
3	Chock Bearer	Approach aircraft from front of nose gear to chock forward and aft of nose wheels. <b>Warning:</b> Do not chock main wheels yet.

4	Headset Man	Connect one end of the grounding cable to the earth receptacle on the ground before connecting the other end to the aircraft nose landing gear (if applicable).
5	Headset Man	Obtain clearance from flight crew to connect GPU. <b>Warning:</b> To avoid distraction, do not assist with GPU connection.
6	Headset Man/ Chock Bearer	Engines must be switched off and spooling down, and anti-collision lights switched off before signaling the chock bearer to chock and ground the main landing gears.
7a	Chock Bearer	Chock aircraft: Nose gear: Maintain approximately 2-inch gap for forward and aft wheels (as appropriate). Main gear: Maintain approximately 2-inch gap away from the front of wheels No gap for aft of wheels (as appropriate).
7b	Chock Bearer	Connect one end of the grounding cable to the earth receptacle on the ground before connecting the other end to the aircraft main landing gear.
8	Headset Man	Establish communications and notify the flight crew "chocks in place".
9	Headset Man	Provide "thumbs-up" signal clearance for personnel and PLB. GSE to approach aircraft with safety cones in position. Refer to para 9.2.2 (d)
10	Operators	Check for damage on the cabin/cargo door and surrounding area before docking GSEs and PLB.

#### 6.4 Departure OIC Roles and Responsibilities

6.4.1 The headset man is the overall-in-charge (Departure OIC) for the departure phase of ground handling. He is empowered to point out any violation which could compromise safety and demand for violation to be corrected.

**Note: The OIC shall contact AMC if operators do not comply with safety procedures.**

6.4.2 The key safety responsibilities of the departure OIC include the following:

1. Ensure that the PLB is fully retracted in its “parked position” or at the “pre-position” (Refer to Annex VIII);
2. Ensure all ground service equipment (GSE) and personnel are positioned outside of the ERA and the adjacent KCZs before aircraft pushback operation;
3. Ensure that the ERA and adjacent KCZs are clear of FOD, equipment and/or spillage (cones used to maintain a safety buffer to the parked aircraft is permissible to be in the KCZ);
4. Ensure pushback path is clear of obstruction - aircraft, FOD, GSEs and/or vehicles.

6.4.3 Details of the Standardised Departure Procedure

Step	Action by	Duties
1	Headset Man	Conduct an FOD walk in accordance with para 5.7.7, and pre-departure checks in accordance with para 10.1.
2	Headset Man/ Airtug Driver	Verify that the tow bar / towbar-less airtug is suitable for the specific aircraft type.
3	Headset Man	<p>Conduct briefing for airtug driver, chock bearer, wingwalker and tail marshaller (where applicable):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Standard/alternate pushback directional instructions.</li> <li>b) Airtug must not be left unattended with engine running and be aware of the location of emergency stop button.</li> <li>c) Point out tow bar shear pin location and confirm it is not sheared.</li> <li>d) Maintain a slow speed during pushback operation.</li> <li>e) Observe all towing angle limitations</li> <li>f) To stop only at the designated stop point.</li> <li>g) Avoid braking abruptly when navigating a curved path.</li> <li>h) Emergency procedure for airtug driver on driving away and for headset man when tow bar completely separates from aircraft.</li> </ol> <p><b>Warning:</b> Applying aircraft park brakes with airtug still connected will cause major damage.</p>

		Failure to move off with tow bar completely separated from aircraft will cause personnel injury and aircraft damage.
4	Headset Man	Confirm and establish headset communications with the flight crew.
5	Headset man	Confirm all GSEs have been disconnected from the aircraft. <b>Note: Only GPU, ACU and ASU can remain connected for APU inoperative aircraft.</b>
6	Headset Man	Ensure all personnel and equipment not involved in pushback remain outside the ERA
7	Headset Man	Insert the correct nose gear steering bypass pin prior to tow bar/ towbar-less airtug connection to the aircraft and ensure the nose gear steering mechanisms are set as required for pushback (as applicable to the aircraft type).
8	Headset Man	Confirm with flight crew that aircraft parking brakes are set.
9	Headset Man	Ensure that the airtug and tow bar is fully secured to the nose landing gear and confirm that the parking brakes are set on the airtug.
10	Headset Man	Walk around check to confirm: a) All gear groundlock pins are removed. b) All passenger steps and PLB are removed from the aircraft and are fully retracted in the designated parking boxes. <b>See Annex VII, Part (2) for exception cases</b> c) All aircraft doors and panels are closed. Special attention to be given to cargo and passenger doors and that there is no damage to aircraft after doors are closed. d) Advise flight crew that pre-departure check has been completed or communicate any discrepancies.

11	Headset Man/ Chock Bearer	Headset Man to give clearance to responsible party to remove chocks according to Section 10.2.2.  For towbarless/remote-controlled airtug operation, grounding cable and chocks at the nose gear may be removed for the purpose of the towbarless/remote-controlled airtug connection. Ensure that towbarless/remote-controlled airtug is fully engaged to the landing gear and confirm that the towbarless/remote-controlled tractor's parking brakes are set.
12	Chock Bearer	Remove all grounding cables and chocks to be stowed in their designated stowage place.  <b>Note: If a chock is stuck, coordinate with pushback crew to move aircraft after flight crew has confirmed aircraft brakes have been released.</b>
13	<b>Applicable only if APU is inoperative. Else, proceed to step 14</b>	
13a	Operator	ACU to be removed from ERA (as per instruction from flight deck crew as required).
13b	Headset Man / Airtug Driver	Check that anti-collision lights have been switched on.
13c	Headset Man	Request permission from flight crew to disconnect GPU.
13d	Operator	After ASU starts aircraft engine, disconnect GPU and remove GPU from ERA  Disconnect and remove ASU from ERA; check that aircraft service panel for ASU is closed.
14	Headset Man	Notify the flight crew "chocks removed".
14a	Headset Man/ Airtug Driver	Headset man to provide pushback directional hand signals in conjunction with verbal communication to airtug driver.  For live departure: Airtug driver to select pushback instruction on Way2Go. Headset man to verify the instruction selected.

14b	Headset Man/ Airtug Driver	Ensure the aircraft pushback path is clear of any obstruction.
14c	Headset Man	<p>Confirm with flight crew that aircraft parking brakes are released.</p> <p>Activate green “turn on” button on the wireless switch panel upon receiving pushback confirmation.</p> <p><b>Note: Only for aircraft stands with the wireless pushback switch (as of Nov 2024: stands 300 to 302, 307-310, 400 to 404, D41 to D49 have been equipped with the wireless pushback switch.)</b></p> <p>Commence pushback after confirmation is given by flight crew.</p> <p><b>Note: Headset man to provide engine start clearances if conditions are safe to do so.</b></p>
14d	Headset Man/ Airtug Driver	<p>In the event of unfavourable visibility conditions (e.g. haze, heavy rain), headset man should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Request for "green" to be switched on</li> <li>• If necessary, consider positioning himself outside the airtug and maintain visual contact with airtug driver throughout pushback.</li> </ul>
14e	Airtug Driver	Stop the airtug when the pushback manoeuvre is completed. Set the airtug parking brake and signal to the headset man that pushback is completed with “Vehicle Brakes On/Stop” signal.
14f	Headset Man	Headset man to verify that pushback manoeuvre has been completed at the correct position based on the pushback procedure.
15	Chock Bearer	Place one chock at forward nose wheel after completion of pushback.
16	Airtug Driver	Position the airtug in the aircraft's path and be visible to the flight crew (if possible) after the tow bar has been disconnected from the airtug.

17	Headset Man	Remove the nose gear steering bypass pin and ensure the nose gear steering mechanisms are set to normal conditions for taxiing.  If previously disconnected, reconnect the torque link and inform flight crew.
18	Headset Man	Disconnect the headset and close the access panel on the aircraft once the approval to disconnect has been given by flight crew.  <b>Note: When disconnecting headset, notify the flight crew by saying "Headset man disconnecting now. See you on the left/right").</b>
19	Headset Man	Give clearance to remove nose wheel chock.
20	Airtug Driver	Drive airtug to the left/right of aircraft and position beside headset man and chock bearer. Remain in position until item 22 is completed.
21	Headset Man	Display the steering bypass pin to the flight crew (if applicable to aircraft type). Once eye contact has been made with the flight crew, give the "All Clear to Taxi" signal. GSPs should refer to IATA IGOM Chapter 3 for the appropriate execution of hand signals.
22	Headset Man	Remain in position until an acknowledgement from the flight crew is received and the aircraft begins to taxi.

**Note: For details on Towable ACU, ASU, GPU operations, please refer to IATA IGOM.**

**Note: After completion of pushback, Headset man can deactivate the wireless pushback switch.**

***Wireless pushback switch is only applicable for aircraft stands with the wireless pushback switch (as of Nov 2024: stands 300 to 302, 307-310, 400 to 404, D41 to D49 have been equipped with the wireless pushback switch.)***

**Note: In the event there is expected prolonged delay before aircraft pushback (e.g. in-flight cabin issues, airtug breakdown, delayed ATC clearance based on pilot's advice), ground crew is to reinstate the wheel chocks and grounding cables accordingly.**



## 7 Aircraft Docking Guidance System / Manual Marshalling

### 7.1 Pre-arrival Handling

- a) Arrive at the aircraft stand at least 15 minutes prior to aircraft's ETA;
- b) Conduct FOD walk per para 5.7.6.3;
- c) Ensure sufficient serviceable wheel chocks, safety pole and grounding cables are provided;
- d) Ensure the PLB is fully retracted and parked at its designated parking box\*;
- e) Conduct a serviceability check on the ADGS. Ensure the correct aircraft type and variant are assigned;
- f) Conduct FOD walk per para 5.7.6. Stand must also be clear of oil / fluid / fuel spillage;
- g) Place two safety cones and a safety pole on them in front of the ERA at no earlier than 5 minutes before ETA and no later than the activation of ADGS;
- h) Maintain an active lookout for equipment entering the ERA / KCZ. In the event of equipment entering the ERA / KCZ, the Arrival OIC shall perform a FOD check along the path that the equipment travelled;
- i) Press the 'confirm' button on the ADGS control panel to activate the ADGS 2 minutes before the aircraft's ETA or upon sighting of the aircraft approaching the stand;
- j) Manual marshallers or ADGS Operators shall standby with marshalling bats or wands (to be illuminated in low visibility / night operations) at all times and marshalling platforms (if required) in the event that manual marshalling is required;
- k) The space fronting aircraft stands, either "No Parking Area" or holding strip, may be used to perform manual marshalling.

**See Annex VIII, Part (1)\***

**Recommendation: A chock may be positioned at least 1 metre away from the edge of the designated stop line to serve as a guidance marker for aircraft nose wheel stop position.**

### 7.2 Arrival Handling

- a) Inform CAG FMC immediately if the ADGS is faulty;
- b) In the event where the ADGS is unavailable or unserviceable, perform manual marshalling using the correct marshalling signals to guide the aircraft into the stand. (Refer to IATA IGOM for the standard marshalling signals);
- c) Do not guide any aircraft for other aircraft stands other than the assigned aircraft stand;
- d) Guide only the assigned airline, aircraft type and variant to a complete stop at the designated aircraft type stop line;

**Note: In the event that an incorrect airline or aircraft type attempts to enter the aircraft stand, ADGS operator shall depress the e-stop button immediately to stop the aircraft from turning or taxiing further into the aircraft stand. Operator shall contact their own operations control centre and CAG (AMC) for the next course of action.**

- e) During taxiing of aircraft into stand, the ERA and adjacent KCZ must be clear of any obstruction;
- f) If the aircraft overshoots / undershoots the designated stop line by more than 0.5 metres (approximately the length of 2 feet), personnel shall arrange for an airtug to reposition the aircraft;

- g) For APU serviceable situations, the arrival crew is to approach the aircraft from the front, only after the aircraft comes to a complete stop with its engines switched off and spooling down, and with anti-collision lights switched off. After chocks and grounding cables are installed, provide the “thumbs-up” signal clearance.
- h) For APU unserviceable situations, arrival crew is to approach the aircraft from the front after it comes to a complete stop. Nose landing gear chocks and grounding cables should be installed. After connection of Ground Power Unit and confirmation that engines are switched off and spooling down and with anti-collision lights switched off, arrival crew can then continue to install chocks and grounding cables for the main landing gears. After completion, provide the “thumbs-up” signal clearance.
- i) If at any time during aircraft movement the ADGS operator / manual marshaller is unsure or identifies an imminent danger, STOP the aircraft by depressing the e-stop button on the ADGS control panel, or giving the ‘STOP’ signal with the use of wands (during manual marshalling).

## 8 Operation of Passenger Loading Bridge

### 8.1 Pre-arrival Handling

- a) Arrive at the stand at least 15 minutes prior to aircraft's ETA;
- b) Ensure that no FOD, GSE or any obstacles are within the red hatched area beneath the PLB and in the surrounding area of the parking stand;
- c) Ensure that the PLB is fully retracted and parked at its designated parking box;  
**See Annex VIII, Part (1) for exception cases**
- d) If the wheels of the PLB are extended beyond the designated parking box, inform ADGS operator not to activate ADGS and do not retract THE PLB. Alert CAG FMC and wait for PLB maintenance staff to respond;
- e) Ensure that the passageway within the PLB is free of FOD prior to aircraft arrival;
- f) Ensure that all safety chains (located in the cab, Tunnel 'A' and PLB entrance) are secured and hooked;
- g) Conduct a serviceability check of the PLB and check for 'No Go' items, the PLB is considered unserviceable if any of the following is faulty:
  - i. Emergency stop;
  - ii. Selector key switch;
  - iii. Power on button;
  - iv. Cabin closure (condition and padding);
  - v. Horizontal drive joystick;
  - vi. Vertical drive buttons;
  - vii. Cab rotation button;
  - viii. Closure drive button;
- h) In the event where the PLB is unserviceable:
  - i. Inform CAG FMC immediately.
  - ii. If the maintenance staff is unable to rectify the PLB fault upon reaching the site, he shall inform the PLB operator.
  - iii. The PLB operator shall inform the ADGS operator, his operations control centre and CAG ACC and wait for further instructions
  - iv. Inform the operations supervisor of the incoming flight and request for a passenger step to be dispatched to the stand;
- i) Position the PLB wheels back into the designated parking box after performing the serviceability checks;
- j) Activate the switches for air conditioning and lighting in the PLB prior to aircraft arrival. Keep the roller shutter/ bi-fold doors closed until the PLB is docked;
- k) Be aware of the incoming aircraft type and position the height of the PLB accordingly;
- l) Standby a marshaller, who would be required in the event when PLB malfunctions. In the event that the auto-dock function is unserviceable and the PLB operator must manually dock the PLB to the aircraft, the PLB operator shall ensure that a marshaller is positioned on the apron ground to guide him in his docking operation.

**Note: Please refer to CAG PLB SOP for more details**

## 8.2 Arrival Handling

- a) Keep the PLB roller shutter/bi-fold doors closed until the PLB is docked;
- b) No other personnel shall be present in the cab during docking. All other personnel shall stand behind the safety chains behind the operator;
- c) Commence PLB docking operation only after receiving the thumbs-up signal from the headset man;
- d) Check the aircraft fuselage for any damage before proceeding to dock the PLB. If any damage is spotted, do not dock the PLB towards the aircraft. Inform CAG AMC and supervisor immediately;
- e) The PLB docking up till 0.5m from the aircraft shall be performed in auto-dock mode. Contact FMC if auto-dock function is unserviceable;
- f) Stop the PLB 0.5 metres from the aircraft, and complete the remaining docking manually;
- g) Conduct visual inspections of the apron operation area through the CCTV screen and side mirror while operating the PLB. If the PLB is suspected to be faulty, do not continue to operate the PLB and notify FMC. If the auto dock process is aborted halfway (due to technical issue), operate the PLB manually with the assistance of ground marshaller to complete the PLB docking process and report the matter to FMC;
- h) In the event that the PLB operates abnormally during auto-dock mode, release the auto-dock button immediately to abort operation. If the PLB does not stop immediately and continues moving, press the red emergency button to stop the PLB immediately;
- i) Adjust and maintain the height between the PLB cab floor and the aircraft door sill based on the height indicated by the height indicator located on the right of the bumper;
- j) Align PLB aircraft alignment marker to the left edge of aircraft door;
- k) After the PLB is docked to the aircraft, activate the auto-leveller and extend the cabin closure fully, prior to opening of the aircraft door;
- l) After all checking sequence is completed and the "auto-leveller" has been activated, remove the key from the operation console;
- m) Unhook the safety chains located in the cab and Tunnel 'A';
- n) Whilst the PLB is docked to the aircraft, the PLB operator shall attend to the PLB when the auto-leveller alarm is activated.

**Caution: For A380 aircraft, the docking of the PLB L2 arm is to be done only after the PLB L1 arm and PLB L3 arm has been docked to the aircraft.**

**Note: Please refer to CAG PLB SOP for a more detailed process of docking the PLB**

## 8.3 Departure Handling

- a) Ensure that a marshaller is deployed on apron ground to assist with the PLB retraction;
- b) Perform a check to ensure that no FOD, GSE or any obstacles are within the red hatched area beneath the PLB and its intended path prior to operating the PLB;
- c) Check the fuselage of the aircraft for any damage before proceeding to retract the PLB from the aircraft. If any damage is spotted, do not retract the PLB. Inform CAG AMC and supervisor immediately;
- d) Ensure that all safety chains are hooked up and secured prior to retracting the PLB;
- e) Ensure that the aircraft door is completely closed prior to disengaging the auto-leveller and retracting the canopy;

- f) Conduct clearance checks and ensure that the marshaller is present before the PLB is retracted;
- g) PLB operator shall maintain visual contact with the marshaller when retracting the PLB. The marshaller is to alert the PLB operator should there be any obstructions in the path of the moving PLB;
- h) Ensure that the PLB roller shutter/bi-fold doors are closed before retracting the PLB
- i) Retract the PLB 0.5 metres manually before setting to auto-retract mode;
- j) If the auto-retract mode is unserviceable, the PLB operator must manually retract the PLB from the aircraft. PLB operator is to inform FMC;
- k) Retract the PLB to the designated parking box position before the start of pushback.  
**See Annex VII, Part (2) for exception cases**

**Caution: For A380 aircraft, the PLB L2 arm is to be retracted first before retracting the PLB L1 arm and the PLB L3 arm.**

- l) Ensure that the PLB wheels are parked within the designated parking boxes;
- m) Set the PLB to the default height at the designated parking box;
- n) Turn the keys to 'OFF' position and remove from the instrument console;
- o) Ensure the emergency button is depressed;
- p) Remain on the bridge until the aircraft is pushed back;
- q) Clear all debris on the passageway;
- r) Inform CAG FMC when:
  - i. PLB is unable to be retracted or
  - ii. PLB operates abnormally during auto-retract mode. PLB operator is to release the auto-retract button immediately to abort operation and to stop the PLB first
- s) In the event where the PLB is unable to be retracted from the departing aircraft, inform CAG FMC;
- t) If there is a need for PLB towing, the PLB operator (in the presence of the CAG PLB maintenance contractor) shall ascertain that:
  - i. The aircraft cabin door is shut;
  - ii. No passengers are in the PLB;
  - iii. Airline representative is informed;
  - iv. Seek the assistance of a tractor driver to tow the PLB.

**Note: Please refer to CAG SOP for more details**

## 9 Operation of Ground Support Equipment Associated with Aircraft Handling and Loading

### 9.1 Introduction

9.1.1 The following safety instructions shall be adhered to at all times when conducting aircraft handling and loading/unloading activities in the aircraft stand.

### 9.2 General Safety Instructions

#### 9.2.1 Basic operating requirements for GSE

- a) All motorised GSE shall be issued with a valid AVP and equipped with a valid fire extinguisher. The validity of the fire extinguisher must be clearly displayed on the extinguisher;
- b) Check equipment prior to initial use (with reference to 9.3.1, 9.3.2 or 9.3.3);
- c) Do not drive GSE with lifting devices in the raised position, except for final positioning onto the aircraft;
- d) Do not operate the platform while in motion;
- e) All GSE shall not touch the aircraft, unless equipped with self-levelling sensors A safety clearance must be maintained between the GSE and the aircraft;
  - i. As a guideline a gap of 2 inches or two fingers width should be the appropriate safety clearance provided between the GSE and the aircraft.
- f) All safety rails must be fully retracted/lowered prior to positioning and removal;
- g) Do not leave any vehicle unattended with its engine running.

**Note: GPUs and ACUs may be left running unattended with its engine running.**


- h) Do not use faulty GSE;
- i) Do not transport wheel chocks and / or safety cones placed on the roof top of GSE such as tractors and covered trolleys. Top of containers shall be free of baggage / cargo / mail;
- j) When handling smaller aircraft such as A320 and B737 etc (i.e. Code A to C), do not tow more than 2 baggage trolleys / carts and dollies within the ERA for positioning for unloading / loading of baggage / cargo purposes;
- k) Deploy stabilisers and parking brakes when GSE is stationary;
- l) Towable ASU, ACU, and GPU shall not be connected to the tow vehicle and aircraft at the same time. Before towing the unit away, the operator shall make sure the unit is disconnected from the aircraft;
- m) All self-propelled GSE interfacing with the aircraft should have aircraft proximity sensor(s) to facilitate the process of safe docking to aircraft;
- n) When operating any GSE, check the aircraft for possible damage in the equipment contact zone before positioning and after removal of GSE to/from the aircraft;
- o) Prior to movement of any GSE/Vehicles, the intended travel path shall be checked and confirmed clear of personnel, equipment or other obstacles;
- p) Use a marshaller when vision is restricted (e.g., during docking of skyloader (motorised/non-motorised), passenger steps (motorised/non-motorised) and hi-lift). The

guide person shall be able to accurately judge clearances and communicate signals to the driver/operator. Stop immediately if visual contact with the marshaller is lost. Movement shall not continue until visual contact is re-established;

- q) Check that throughout the turnaround process that a clearance is maintained between the GSE and the fuselage/doors to allow vertical movement of the aircraft during loading/unloading process.

### 9.2.2 Ramp safety in aircraft handling

- a) If using access steps to open and close cargo hold doors, position and remove the steps in a straight line. Do not move or re-position the steps while a staff member is on the steps.
- b) Do not drive GSE faster than walking speed;
- c) All motorised vehicles / equipment shall make at least one safety stop prior to entering the ERA; the stop shall be no less than 5 metres from the aircraft;
- d) GSE travelling along a parked aircraft must keep at least 1 metre away. Reference point shall be used to gauge the minimum safety distance. Safety cones placed along various parts of the aircraft (maximum 1 metre away from the aircraft) are examples of reference points for drivers;



- e) Marshalls are to be deployed when reversing GSE towards the aircraft;
- f) Ensure all vehicles and equipment used for the handling of aircraft are pre-positioned in an orderly manner within the ESA prior to aircraft's ETA. No parts of the vehicles and equipment shall be protruding into the ERA and KCZ. The equipment shall not be parked in an area that will be affected by jet blast or cause obstruction to:
  - i. Arriving aircraft;
  - ii. Vehicular traffic lanes;
  - iii. Adjacent stands.
- g) Strictly no personnel, vehicle and / or equipment are allowed in the ERA prior to aircraft arrival;

- h) No parking is permitted in the KCZ at all times. KCZ should be kept clear at all times during aircraft movement, except for cones used to maintain a safety buffer to the parked aircraft;
- i) Check the surrounding area to ensure there is no FOD on all equipment, in the ERA and the adjacent keep clear zones;
- j) All persons and GSE not involved in the aircraft departure operation are to remain outside of the ERA;
- k) All persons shall not walk or stand in between chains of non-motorised GSEs, such as Baggage Trolleys, Container Trailers, Pallet Dollies, Steps, even when they are stationary;
- l) The ground personnel performing the final check on the aircraft shall check to ensure that all aircraft servicing panels and / or hatches are closed and latched;
- m) All non-motorised GSE such as container/pallet dollies, trolleys and maintenance steps are to be secured with built-in braking mechanisms or/and chained to the D-ring when parked.

### **9.3 GSE Operations**

#### **9.3.1 Pre-operation equipment inspection (motorised GSE)**

- a) Conduct visual checks for damage, cracks or abnormal wear;
- b) Brakes are operational;
- c) Illumination & indication lights are functional;
- d) Warning systems are functional;
- e) Steering is functional;
- f) No fluid and/or oil leaks;
- g) No bald tyres;
- h) Rubber bumpers are serviceable;
- i) Where installed, automatic cut-out features such as rat-tail, sensors, etc. are present and without visible damage;
- j) Vehicles are equipped with chocks (where relevant)

**Note: Not applicable to refuellers/hydrant dispensers.**

#### **9.3.2 Pre-operation equipment inspection (non-motorised GSE)**

- a) Conduct visual checks for damage, cracks or abnormal wear;
- b) Stabilisers and braking mechanisms are functional;
- c) No bald tyres.

**Note: Not applicable to refuellers/hydrant dispensers.**

#### **9.3.3 Pre-operation equipment inspection (applicable to refuellers/ hydrant dispensers only)**

- a) Conduct visual checks for damage, cracks or abnormal wear;
- b) Brakes are operational;
- c) Illumination & indication lights are functional;
- d) No fluid and/or oil leaks;
- e) No bald tyres.



#### 9.3.4 Load carried by GSE

- a) All load carried by the vehicle shall be secured at all times;
- b) The use of plastic sheeting over the top of the load is acceptable however, it shall always be placed underneath the cargo net and be adequately tucked into the edges of the load to prevent it from becoming potential FOD during transportation or strong wind conditions.

#### 9.3.5 Unit Load Devices (ULDs)

- a) ULDs refer to baggage and cargo containers. Do not store ULDs on the ground and always use a suitable ULD base support system;
- b) ULDs shall be secured on dollies or trailers/trucks;
- c) Pallet and container dollies may only be towed with the turntables in the locked position ("straight ahead") and rotated only when at the loading and unloading phase;
- d) During transportation the load on trolleys and dollies shall be properly secured by using appropriate locks, stops, rails, curtains and straps.

#### 9.3.6 Tall non-motorised equipment

Tall non-motorised equipment includes (but is not limited to) tailstand, maintenance step, cabin access step and other such NMEs that are of a height that pose a risk to damaging the aircraft if improperly handled. When operating tall non-motorised equipment:

- a) Conduct visual checks for damage, cracks or abnormal wear;
- b) Brakes and stabilisers are functional;
- c) Rubber bumpers, where applicable, are in good condition;
- d) If towed by a tractor, tractor to stop no less than 2 metres from aircraft and release the equipment before manually positioning it to the aircraft;
- e) During manual positioning of the equipment, operator is to ensure that speed of approach is low at all times;
- f) At no time should tall non-motorised equipment be towed under the wings or fuselage of the aircraft;
- g) At no time should tall non-motorised equipment be travelling over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft;
- h) Operator shall ensure the path of travel and positioning of the equipment stay clear of the airframe and account for possible rollaway path in the event of brakes failure;
- i) Use a marshaller when vision is restricted. Stop immediately if visual contact with the marshaller is lost;
- j) Maintain a safety gap between the equipment and aircraft;
- k) Once positioned, engage stabilisers.

#### 9.3.7 Motorised and non-motorised passenger steps/stairs

- a) Check that the passenger stairs and the condition of the rubber bumpers are serviceable before use;
- b) Passenger steps/stairs shall be positioned outside the ERA before aircraft arrival and departure;
- c) Move the passenger steps/stairs slowly towards the aircraft, avoiding any aircraft sensors or protrusions. Maintain a safety gap between the rubber bumper and the aircraft if the passenger step/stair is not equipped with self-levelling device. If the passenger step/stair is equipped with self-levelling device, continue movement until

either the protective bumpers just touch the aircraft or the equipment's proximity sensors stop the movement;

- d) If the passenger steps/stairs are towed (non-motorised equipment), disconnect them from the tractor and manually position them towards the aircraft;
- e) Drivers shall not drive steps/stairs over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft at all times;
- f) Maintain adequate clearance between the passenger steps/stairs and the underside of the cabin door, or as directed by the cabin door markings to prevent damage;
- g) Make sure any guardrails and canopies on the passenger step platform are fully retracted during positioning;
- h) Extend guardrails after the cabin door has been opened;
- i) If equipped with stabilisers, ensure they are deployed before the steps is used for servicing. Deploy other safety devices, if fitted;
- j) Close the cabin door before removing the passenger steps/stairs;
- k) After the cabin door has been closed, confirm that there is no person on the passenger steps/stairs prior to retracting stabilisers;
- l) Non-motorised passenger steps/stairs are to be manually positioned away from the aircraft to a suitable position before connecting them to the tractor for towing;
- m) Driver to use extremely slow (e.g. "snail" speed or equivalent) speed when docking and reversing from the aircraft.

**Note: Aircraft cabin door shall not be in open position without any GSE (platform or PLB) securely positioned at the door, or a fall prevention device (e.g., door safety barrier, door net) is in place across the door. The cabin door strap installed in aircraft doors is not considered an appropriate fall prevention device.**

### 9.3.8 Belt loader/skyloader

9.3.8.1 When operating the belt loader/skyloader:

- a) Check that the rubber bumpers are in good condition before deploying;
- b) Position and remove the equipment in a straight line with the cargo hold door at a 90° angle to the aircraft fuselage till cleared of aircraft engine;
- c) The rubber bumpers must never come into contact with the aircraft and always maintain a safety gap between the equipment and aircraft at all times when docking;
- d) Drivers shall not drive over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft at all times;
- e) After the equipment (including the boom) is in final position, raise and/or extend the guardrails and ensure a safety clearance is always maintained between the guardrail and the aircraft fuselage;
- f) Do not sit/stand on the conveyor belt during GSE movement and when the conveyor belt is in operation (up/down);
- g) No personnel should be on the belt when the conveyor belt is being operated or when the boom is being raised or lowered;
- h) When placing items on the conveyor belt, ensure that they are stable and will not fall off;
- i) Do not overload;

- j) For a towable skyloader, disconnect them from the tractor first before manually positioning them towards the aircraft;
- k) To inspect the baggage loading and unloading areas every time an aircraft is serviced, to check for and remove FODs, such as baggage wheels, zippers, bag locks and name tags;
- l) Driver to use extremely slow (e.g. “snail” speed or equivalent) speed when docking and reversing from the aircraft;
- m) Do not use skyloader to transport baggage, cargo or other items around the airside;
- n) When unloading or loading items between the belt and aircraft cargo hold, ensure items are stable, correctly positioned and that the items do not come into contact with the aircraft fuselage/cargo hold door.

### 9.3.9 Transporter/ JCPL/ MDL

#### 9.3.9.1 When operating transporters/JCPL/MDL:

- a) Check that the rubber bumpers are in good condition before deploying;
- b) Check that the GSE is serviceable before use;
- c) Never drive the GSE under the aircraft wings;
- d) Drivers shall not drive over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft at all times;
- e) Do not use the JCPL/MDL to transport ULDs across the ramp;
- f) When reversing from aircraft, do so in a straight line with the cargo hold door at a 90° angle to the aircraft fuselage, avoiding any aircraft sensors or wing fairings, till clear of aircraft engine;
- g) Driver to use extremely slow (e.g. “snail” speed or equivalent) speed when docking and reversing from the aircraft;
- h) Maintain a safety gap between the equipment and aircraft when docking.
- i) Only personnel required for the JCPL / MDL operation shall be on the bridge while manoeuvring;
- j) Do not open/close cargo access hold doors while standing on a JCPL/MDL;
- k) Engage safety systems and auto-leveller features, if applicable. If the JCPL /MDL is not equipped with an auto-leveller, ensure that a safety distance is constantly monitored and maintained. No personnel should be using the stairs when the bridge of the JCPL/MDL is being raised or lowered;
- l) No personnel are allowed to sit or stand on the roller bed of the Transporter;
- m) No personnel are allowed to walk or stand between the Transporter and JCPL / MDL or between dollies;
- n) No personnel are allowed to walk or stand on the platform of JCPL/MDL.

### 9.3.10 Elevating equipment

#### 9.3.10.1 When operating elevating equipment:

- a) The final position of the GSE must allow for a safe working area while in the raised position at the aircraft door to prevent personnel and objects from falling;
- b) Maintain a safety gap between the equipment and aircraft when docking;
- c) Check for any obstructions over both sides of the GSE before lowering;

- d) Engage stabilisers and parking brakes when equipment is stationary;
- e) Close and secure all doors when servicing is completed;
- f) Drivers shall not drive over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft at all times;
- g) The positioning of the elevating equipment shall allow the loading platform to be perpendicular and at the same level to the aircraft doorsill;
- h) Before accessing the platform at the front or rear of the elevating equipment, ensure the platform is at the same level as the equipment cabin;
- i) Ensure that in any case where the elevated platform is offset, the platform should return to its proper position before lowering operations commence;
- j) Ensure all load (carts, wheelchairs) are secured and access doors / shutters closed before raising or lowering the equipment.

#### 9.3.11 Potable Water Servicing and Toilet Servicing

- a) Wear PPE at all times;
- b) After servicing, ensure that the fitting caps and service panel door are closed and latched;
- c) Report any spillage on the aircraft stand to an appropriate supervisor for cleaning arrangement;
- d) Drivers shall not drive over fuel hydrant pits, hoses or bonding cables used for refuelling of aircraft at all times.

#### 9.3.12 Tractor

- a) Prior to moving off with towed load, ensure there are no personnel and/or other equipment between or near the towed load to prevent injuries;
- b) Take care to avoid sudden sharp turns, jerks and stops;
- c) When Tractor is near the skyloader during aircraft handling, maintain a safety gap to prevent accidental contact. Adjust the position of the carts/dollies by hands as required, when positioning trolleys/dollies when in close proximity with the skyloader;
- d) When removing carts during the loading on or unloading from smaller aircraft or aircraft with low wings, the tractor shall be positioned pointing away from the aircraft wing and the cart manoeuvred by hand to the tractor, as required;
- e) Ensure all towed loads are secured and flaps or curtains are secured before transporting;
- f) To avoid unnecessary movement, dollies/carts' brakes shall be applied. Chocks are to be inserted where applicable. Dollies/carts are to be connected as a chain where possible;
- g) If during towing of trolleys/dollies and there are other equipment near the towed load, operator shall perform the towing operation with care and ensure that no other equipment are being contacted.

**Note: Refer to the operating airline's GOM for specific instructions as per aircraft type.**

#### 9.4 Aircraft Ground Stability

- a) In general, when loading, load forward holds before aft holds;
- b) When offloading, offload aft holds before forward holds;

- c) To avoid “tail-tipping” during ground operations, sequential loading/unloading instructions shall be followed in accordance with airlines’ requirements;
- d) Supervision personnel shall observe the aircraft ground stability during ground operations;
- e) For cargo aircraft, a tail support stanchion or nose tether may be required to be fitted during loading and offloading.

## **9.5 Grounding of Aircraft**

### **9.5.1 Introduction**

- 9.5.1.1 It is mandatory to ground the aircraft at three points when the aircraft is parked at the aircraft stand **at all times**, as a means of lightning protection for all apron staff servicing the aircraft.
- 9.5.1.2 The practice of 3-point aircraft grounding is applicable to all aircraft types, except for Boeing 737. Boeing 737 only has 2 designated ground points, 2-point aircraft grounding should be carried out when handling the Boeing 737 aircraft.
- 9.5.1.3 All airside personnel are to exercise responsibility when using the aircraft grounding cables, and to always return them to their designated position after use.

### **9.5.2 Connection of grounding cables**

- 9.5.2.1 When connecting the grounding cable, one should always connect one end of the grounding cable to the earth receptacle point before connecting the other end to the aircraft grounding point
- 9.5.2.2 Headset man to ensure that grounding cables are connected at the nose and two main landing gears before proceeding to connect the headset transceiver to establish communications with the cockpit pilot.

### **9.5.3 Removal of grounding cables**

Remove grounding cables together with chocks only after the following:

- a) Loading GSE have been disconnected from the aircraft including the PLB;
- b) Airtug is connected to the aircraft;
- c) Airtug parking brake is engaged;
- d) Aircraft parking brake is engaged.

**\*To note: Start the disconnection of the grounding cables from the aircraft grounding point before proceeding to the earth receptacle point.**

**\*To note: Grounding cables and chocks at nose landing gear may be removed earlier to facilitate the connection of towbar-less airtug.**

## **9.6 Aircraft Departure**

### **9.6.1 Removal of wheel chocks**

9.6.1.1 Remove the chocks only when:

- a) Loading GSEs have been disconnected from the aircraft, including the PLB;
- b) Airtug is connected to the aircraft;
- c) Airtug parking brake is engaged;
- d) Aircraft parking brake is engaged.

9.6.1.2 Do not leave wheel chocks on the ramp. When not in use, stow them in their designated stowage place at the aircraft stand.

### **9.6.2 Removal of safety cones**

9.6.2.1 Safety cones may be removed with the PLB still connected if all GSEs have been undocked to the aircraft. However, safety cones must be placed back in the event that there is a need to dock any GSEs again. Headset man must be attentive at this time to avoid any ERA infringement and vehicle failure to give way to aircraft cases.

9.6.2.2 Aircraft tail cone shall only be removed when aircraft is ready for pushback.

## 10 Aircraft Pushback

### 10.1 Pre-departure Handling

10.1.1 The pre-departure checks should start after all ground servicing activities have been completed. The check shall start as close as possible to departure time. If GSE is still docked to the aircraft at the time of the check, or if GSE re-engages with the aircraft after the check, the applicable area(s) shall be re-inspected.

10.1.2 The pre-departure checks shall include the following:

- a) Ensure that the surface condition is safe to conduct the pushback operation i.e. clear of oil spill and other FOD;
- b) Ensure all the aircraft service doors / panels and cargo hold access doors are closed and locked (except for external power and headset panels);
  - a. Handles are flushed with the fuselage and, where applicable, all other visible indicators confirm that doors are correctly locked.
  - b. There is no visible damage on the aircraft, particularly around cabin and cargo hold access doors.
- c) Only the required equipment and personnel involved are in the ERA;
- d) All GSE including PLB are detached and ERA and KCZ are clear of obstructions. Ensure that the PLB(s) are fully retracted, and wheels are parked correctly within the designated parking boxes;  
**Note: See Annex VII, Part (2) for exception cases.**
- e) Ensure that the pushback path is clear of obstructions. Ensure adequate clearance exists between the aircraft and facilities or fixed obstacles along the aircraft movement path;
- f) Any observed abnormalities on the aircraft (e.g. obvious damage, fluid leakage, unremoved pitot covers) are immediately brought to the attention of the flight crew, maintenance personnel and supervisor; and
- g) Landing gear safety pins are removed.

**Caution: If any of the above conditions or actions are not met, pushback should not commence. Inform CAG AMC, the supervisor, the maintenance department (where relevant) and the flight crew as this may affect the safety of the intended flight.**

### 10.2 Departure Handling

10.2.1 The following shall be adhered to during the departure of an aircraft:

- a) All ground crew responsible for aircraft pushback are to familiarise themselves with the latest pushback procedures of the designated aircraft stand in CAG Way2Go, CAG SWEET, AOCs (Airport Operations Central System), or from the posters displayed at the aircraft stand, after arrival at the stand and prior to performing pushback;
- b) If there are any inconsistencies or ambiguities between the different sources of pushback procedures, pushback crew is to call Airside Management Centre for clarifications on which pushback procedure to follow;

- c) The flight deck crew and headset man shall read back the pushback instruction or acknowledge in a manner to clearly indicate that they understood and will comply with the given instruction;
- d) For live departure, airtug driver is to select the pushback instruction received from headset man in Way2Go and headset man is to verify the selection made before pushback commences;
- e) Whenever the pushback crew is in doubt, the team is to stop the pushback operation immediately and seek verification before continuing;  
**Caution: In the event that pushback crew has safety concerns of the instructed pushback procedure, pushback crew to share concerns with flight crew and tower for further instructions.**
- f) Establish and maintain communication with the flight crew via headset throughout the whole operation. In the event of interphone communication failure, hand signals are to be used to communicate with the flight crew;
- g) Remain clear of the hazard zones during pushback operation of aircraft:
  - a. The area on the ground directly under any part of the aircraft (including, but not limited to, the fuselage, wings, stabilizer, engines, nose gear)
  - b. The aircraft's path
  - c. The tractor's path
  - d. Engine danger areas

Note: Pushback/tow crew may approach the aircraft nose gear safely during connection and disconnection of airtug

- h) If headset man is positioned outside the airtug, headset man is to maintain visual contact with the airtug driver throughout the pushback. If headset man is too close to the nose gear or pushback equipment, the airtug driver shall stop the pushback and review the required safety clearance conducted;
- i) Use standard phraseology for all verbal communication between the flight deck and ground personnel. Provision is to be made for a back-up communication system, which is to be used in the event of a failure of the primary system;
- j) Use standard hand signals for manual communications;
- k) Start the pushback operation slowly and in a straight line;
- l) Perform the pushback at no more than 5 km/h;
- m) In the event of poor ground surface or slippery conditions, perform the pushback at a slower speed and avoid sudden turns, deceleration, or acceleration
- n) In the event of low visibility conditions, ground handling personnel are to undertake low visibility aircraft ground movement operations as trained/authorised;
- o) During and upon completion of pushback, align the aircraft such that the relevant taxiway centreline/pushback line/lead-in line (in accordance with the pushback procedure) is in between the aircraft main landing gears to provide sufficient wing and tail clearance. Also align the airtug/towbar combination with the centreline of the aircraft gear at the end of the pushback operation;
- p) Spread out the braking process over a long distance, brake lightly and progressively while reducing speed as gradually as possible;



- q) Avoid abrupt turning of the steering wheel as this can potentially be a skid trigger. Always observe gentle and gradual steering;
- r) Ensure during pushback that the steering turn limits are not exceeded and advise the flight crew if they are exceeded. Damage may occur to the nose gear. (Refer to the operating airline's GOM for the specific limits);
- s) Do not brake abruptly when navigating a curved path or making a turn. Driver should decelerate gradually while still on the straight path in anticipation of the turn (or curve);
- t) If the aircraft is to be pulled forward after pushback, aircraft engines shall be at idle thrust throughout and the pull forward manoeuvre shall be performed in the lowest gear of the airtug;
- u) If the aircraft is to be pulled forward after pushback and engines have started, take special precautions to reduce the risk of the aircraft's engine thrust causing damage to the nose gear and tow bar when stopping the aircraft at the end of the manoeuvre;
- v) Stop the airtug when the pushback manoeuvre is completed. Set the airtug parking brake and signal to the headset man using "Vehicle Brakes On/Stop" signal that pushback is completed;
- w) Headset man to inform flight crew to set parking brake. Once confirmed that the aircraft brakes are on, headset man to give the "Vehicle Brakes On/Stop" signal to the airtug driver. Airtug driver to release the airtug parking brake and put the gear selector in neutral in order to release any pressure on the towbar;
- x) If a revised instruction is received after pushback operation has commenced, pushback crew to make a gradual stop and clarify/confirm with flight crew before proceeding. In the event that the aircraft is required to tow back to original parking stand, pushback crew is to seek new pushback clearance from ATC before commencing pushback;
- y) In the event there is any disconnection between the airtug and aircraft during aircraft movement, flight crew should be notified immediately.

**Caution: Flight crew and aircraft maintenance personnel must be informed if aircraft overtakes/pushes the airtug, as both airtug and aircraft nose landing gear may be damaged by the incident.**

**Caution: During the course of pushback operation, if there is any need for deviation from the pushback procedure, pushback crew to inform flight crew and seek Changi Tower's permission first before proceeding.**

#### 10.2.2 Headset man to conduct the following as part of the wheel chock removal process:

- a) Via the interphone, confirm the aircraft parking brake is set;
- b) Check all GSE have been disconnected from the aircraft, except for GPU and ASU when air start is required;
- c) Check the PLB or passenger steps have been retracted from the aircraft, if applicable;
- d) Check the airtug and towbar are fully secured to the nose gear and the parking brake is set on the airtug;
- e) For towbarless airtug operation, check that equipment is fully secured to the applicable landing gear and the parking brake is set on the airtug;
  - Remove chocks at applicable gear only and leave remaining chocks in place until departure.

- Nose gear wheel chocks may be removed without notification, provided the main gear wheel chocks are still positioned.
- f) Give clearance to ground staff member to remove chocks.

### 10.3 Pushback Operations

10.3.1 **Each aircraft type has** specific requirements for the bypass of the nose gear steering mechanism. Refer to the operating airline’s GOM for nose gear steering bypass pin details

**Note: The steering bypass pin shall be: (1) labelled with the specific aircraft type(s) for which it can be used, (2) identified with a “Remove Before Flight” streamer, and (3) checked regularly for proper technical condition, or as per manufacturer instructions.**

Note: For aircraft not fitted with a nose gear steering by-pass system, ensure the steering hydraulic system is depressurized or the nose gear steering torque links are disconnected. Coordination with the flight deck would be required to ensure a safe depressurization and re-pressurization of the aircraft hydraulic system.

#### Airtug and Tow Bar Operations

10.3.2 For airtug and tow bar operations, the follow steps shall be adhered to:

##### *Connection*

- a) Ensure chocks are in place and the correct bypass pin is installed before connecting the tow bar to the aircraft’s nose gear;
- b) Detach the tow bar from the airtug before connecting it to the aircraft’s nose gear;
- c) When connecting the tow bar back to the airtug, do not straddle the tow bar. Face the airtug with both legs on one side of the tow bar;
- d) Ensure all GSE and PLB are detached from the aircraft before connecting airtug to aircraft;
- e) Once connected, ensure airtug gear is set to “Park” or “Neutral” , and engage the parking brake until pushback commences;
- f) Do not leave the airtug connected to the aircraft unattended with engine running. Ensure that the tow bar wheels are fully retracted before commencing pushback;
- g) If GPU is connected to the aircraft, confirm with the flight crew that it is not in use before removing it. GPU shall be removed from the ERA before commencing pushback.

##### *Disconnection*

- h) Before disconnecting the tow bar at the end of push:
  - Inform the flight deck to set the aircraft parking brakes and position the chock at the front of the nose gear wheel.
- i) Airtug driver to release the airtug parking brake and put the gear selector in neutral in order to release any pressure on the towbar;

- Ensure the towbar is disconnected from the airtug before disconnecting from the aircraft (except where the towbar is specifically designed to be disconnected from the aircraft first).
- j) The responsible ground crew shall disconnect the towbar from the nose landing gear and reconnect to the airtug and move clear of the airtug, in view of the driver;
- k) The responsible ground crew shall give an “OK” signal to the airtug driver to confirm that the towbar is reconnected, and it is clear to drive away;
- l) After disconnecting the airtug from the nose gear, airtug driver is to position the airtug such that it is visible from the cockpit;
- m) Headset man is to remove the nose gear steering bypass pin and complete headset communication;
- n) Once clearance signal from the flight crew is given, disconnect the headset. Move clear of the aircraft to a safe position visible to the flight crew and display the bypass pin to the flight deck (if applicable to aircraft type);
- o) Remain on standby at the stand until the aircraft taxis away on its own.

### **Towbar-less Airtug Operations**

10.3.3 For towbar-less airtug operations, the following steps shall be adhered to:

#### *Connection*

- a) Ensure the correct aircraft type is selected on the towbar-less airtug control panel, where applicable and in accordance with towbar-less airtug operating procedures;
- b) Ensure chocks are in place, the correct bypass pin is installed and all GSE and PLB are detached from the aircraft before connecting the airtug to the aircraft’s nose gear;
- c) Align the towbar-less airtug with the aircraft nose wheels prior to connection;
- d) Ensure the aircraft MLG are symmetrically chocked before connecting the towbar-less airtug;
- e) Ensure that the aircraft nose wheels are safely locked in the towbar-less airtug locking mechanism when connected to the aircraft;
- f) Once connected, ensure airtug gear is set to “Park” or “Neutral”, and engage the parking brake until pushback commences;
- g) Ensure that aircraft nose wheels are lifted well above ground before commencing pushback;
- h) When the pushback is completed, inform the flight deck to set the aircraft parking brakes before disconnecting the towbar-less airtug;
- i) Do not leave the airtug connected to the aircraft unattended with engine running.

#### *Disconnection*

- j) After disconnecting the airtug at the end of push, position the chock at the front of the nose gear;
- k) Position the airtug such that it is visible from the cockpit;
- l) Remove the nose gear steering bypass pin and complete headset communication;
- m) Once clearance signal from the flight crew is given, disconnect the headset. Move clear of the aircraft to a safe position visible to the flight crew and display the bypass pin to the

flight deck (if applicable to aircraft type). Remain on standby at the stand until the aircraft taxis away on its own;

**Note: In adherence to aviation lighting luminance standards, some embedded lights/cat eye devices in the airfield cannot be completely flushed to the ground. While these are safe for drive-over by normal aircraft and vehicles; the cradle of towbar-less airtug – if incompletely lifted off the ground – may damage these embedded lights.**

- n) Ensure that cradle of the towbar-less airtug is always fully lifted off the ground, except at the point when the airtug is engaging/disengaging the aircraft nose wheels;
- o) Fully lift the cradle immediately after disconnecting from the aircraft; and prior to moving off from the taxiways or ERA.



**Cradle not fully lifted**



**Cradle fully lifted**

### **Remote-Controlled Pushback Operations**

10.3.4 For remote-controlled pushback operations, the following steps should be adhered to:

#### *Connection*

- a) Ensure the remote-control unit's battery and remote-controlled airtug are sufficiently charged for the pushback operation;
- b) Switch on the remote-control unit and ensure it connects to the airtug;
- c) Pre-position remote-controlled airtug (e.g. Mototok tug) near the nose landing gear. DO NOT connect the remote-controlled airtug to the aircraft nose gear wheels until all ground support equipment and the PLB(s) are removed, and aircraft parking brakes are set;
- d) Ensure chocks are in place and the correct bypass pin is installed before connecting the airtug to the aircraft's nose gear;
- e) Ensure the aircraft MLG are symmetrically chocked before connecting the remote-controlled airtug;
- f) Ensure aircraft nose wheels are safely locked into the airtug cradle by its locking mechanism;
- g) When flight crew receives clearance for the pushback, headset man shall ensure all chocks and grounding cables are removed before informing flight crew to release aircraft parking brakes;
- h) Face the aircraft and do not walk in the path of the remote-controlled airtug pivot area during pushback;
- i) Do not leave the remote-controlled airtug connected to the aircraft unattended with engine running.

#### *Disconnection*

- j) After disconnecting the remote-controlled airtug at the end of push, position the chock at the front of the nose gear;
- k) After disconnecting the tug from the nose gear, check that other staff are clear of the airtug's intended travel path. Before commencing any turns, ensure that the wheel cradle is completely clear of the aircraft nose landing gear. Position the remote-controlled airtug such that it is visible from the cockpit before removing the bypass pin;
- l) Remove the nose gear steering bypass pin and complete headset communication;
- m) Once clearance signal from the flight crew is given, disconnect the headset. Move clear of the aircraft to a safe position visible to the flight crew and display the bypass pin to the flight deck (if applicable to aircraft type);
- n) For the safety of the operator, remote-controlled pushback should not be performed in the event of lightning warning;
- o) Remain on standby at the stand in a position visible to the flight crew until the aircraft taxis away on its own;

**Caution: After disconnection of the headset, no attempt shall be made to approach the aircraft unless cleared by the flight crew to do so via hand signals.**

## **10.4 Wing walker**

10.4.1 If wing walkers are deployed, the wing walkers or other assist personnel shall:

- a) Take instructions from the responsible ground crew;
- b) Use proper hand marshalling signals (with reference to latest IATA IGOM) with either high visibility wands or bats. Lighted wands shall be used during low visibility / night operations;
- c) Be positioned before and during movement of aircraft approximately 1m outboard of the wingtip and with a clear view of wingtip clearance and any potential hazards;
- d) Maintain a safe distance from the moving aircraft and airtug during the entire pushback
- e) Be clear of engine hazard zones;
- f) Maintain visual contact with airtug driver;
- g) Maintain situational awareness to avoid personal injury hazards e.g. moving equipment and vehicles, aircraft, slip, trip and fall hazards such as chocks, cones, GSE, uneven ground, spillages, etc;
- h) Ensure the aircraft movement path is clear of any obstructions, other aircraft, vehicles etc;
- i) Provide "Safe to Proceed" clearance signals at all times to the headset man by using a distinct "Pendulum" motion of the arm unless an obstruction or hazard is detected;
- j) Continue to monitor the aircraft path until the aircraft is stopped;
- k) If at any time during aircraft movement, the wingwalkers are unsure or identify an imminent danger, signal to the responsible ground crew to stop the aircraft with the "STOP" signal;
- l) Position themselves in clear view of the cockpit at a safe distance away from the aircraft upon completion of pushback.

## 10.5 Incidents during Pushback Operations

Flight Crew	Airtug Driver
<b>VHF Communication Failure</b>	
<p>If during pushback operation the interphone fails, the aircraft must be immediately stopped and an alternate means of communication established before continuing. If this is not possible, assistance must be requested.</p>	
<b>Airtug Failure</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Changi Tower.</li> <li>• Apply parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Listen to VHF and wait for assistance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set.</li> <li>• Apply airtug parking brake.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform flight crew.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Chock the aircraft.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Coupling Break Off</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brake the assembly by stepping on both brake pedals progressively.</li> <li>• As soon as the aircraft is at a standstill, apply the parking brake before releasing the pedal.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Changi Tower.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform the flight crew immediately.</li> <li>• Do not apply airtug brakes.</li> <li>• Follow the aircraft path attentively and stop the airtug according to the aircraft position.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Airtug Fire</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Changi Tower and headset man.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Determine the need for aircraft emergency evacuation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform the flight crew.</li> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Disconnect and move airtug away as rapidly as possible, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Fight the fire using the fire extinguisher, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact AES and control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Flight Crew	Airtug Driver
<b><i>Aircraft Fire</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Changi Tower and headset man.</li> <li>• Apply the parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Evacuate the aircraft using on-board means, if required.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Disconnect and move airtug away as rapidly as possible, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft, where possible. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact AES and control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b><i>Accident with Other Aircraft or Vehicle</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Changi Tower</li> <li>• Listen to VHF and wait for assistance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Apply airtug parking brake.</li> <li>• Inform the flight crew.</li> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> <li>• Do not disconnect the airtug unless specifically instructed to do so by the headset man.</li> <li>• If disconnecting the airtug, the aircraft must be chocked.</li> </ul>
<b><i>Visual Contact with the Wing Walkers and/or Marshaller is Lost (if used)</i></b>	
<p>In the event that the airtug driver is unable to establish visual contact with one or both of the wing walkers or the marshaller, when required, the towing operation should be stopped and not recommence until visual contact is reestablished.</p>	

## 11 Aircraft Towing

### 11.1 Towing Operations

11.1.1 An overall-in-charge shall be identified for aircraft towing operation. The assigned personnel is usually the flight deck engineer. The overall-in-charge shall brief all other personnel involved in the operation of their responsibilities:

- a) Ensure the latest aerodrome map is used by the towing crew;
- b) Ensure the towing crew is familiar with the taxiway layout of the airport;
- c) Ensure the towing crew is familiar with the taxiway/taxilane wingspan restrictions;
- d) Personnel should be instructed on the hazards associated with aircraft movement operations e.g. engine ingestion, nose-wheel movement, aircraft track, visibility;
- e) Personnel performing the functions required by the operation shall be positioned away from hazard zones;
- f) Only those persons required to perform operating functions are in the operating area;
- g) Communication with the flight deck or brake operator should, if possible, be achieved in a manner that eliminates the need for personnel to walk near the aircraft nose-gear or the airtug during the operation e.g. use of flexible cord to airtug driver, or cordless system;
- h) Standard phraseology should be used for all verbal communication between the flight deck or brake operator and ground personnel;
- i) Provision should be made for a back-up communication system in the event of a failure of the primary system;
- j) Standard hand signals should be used for manual communications;
- k) Prior to moving an aircraft all personnel involved in the operation shall be briefed and agreed on how communication should be performed and towing manoeuvred;
- l) The headset man is to also inform the RP (defined in 5.7.5.1) to perform the pre-arrival FOD check of the stand that the aircraft is to be towed into and ensure that PLBs are in the correct designated parking positions (refer to Annex VIII);
- m) The RP performing the pre-arrival FOD check of the arrival stand shall place safety cones and pole at the front of the ERA before conducting the FOD walk. The safety cones and pole may be moved away if they are in the path of the airtug when aircraft is being towed in;
- n) Personnel performing marshalling or wing-walking functions shall, use either high visibility wands or bats. Lighted wands shall be used during low visibility / night operations;
- o) It is the responsibility of the aircraft towing crew to stop before the lighted stop bar before the taxiway junctions and seek further instructions from Changi Tower if unsure of which direction/or turns to take;
- p) It is also the responsibility of the aircraft towing crew to stop at the stop bar when the red stop bar lights are illuminated;
- q) Please refer to the table below for the aircraft towing speed limit to be adhered:



Maximum Aircraft Towing Speed Limit	
Type of Airtug	Maximum Speed Limit
Conventional	15km/hr
Towbarless	25km/hr

- r) In adverse weather conditions or when making turns, reduce towing speed;
- s) Avoid abrupt turning of the steering wheel as this can potentially be a skid trigger.  
Always observe gentle and gradual and steering;
- t) Do not brake abruptly when navigating a curved path or making a turn during towing.  
Decelerate gradually while still on a straight path in anticipation of a turn;
- u) Observe towing angle limitation as sharp angle between the tug and the towbar during pushback or towing can damage towbar or aircraft;
- v) The general area of the operation shall be kept clear of GSE;
- w) Towing crew shall never enter runways and rapid exit taxiways;
- x) Towing crew shall request for follow-me service when required to do so and to keep a safety distance from follow-me service to allow sufficient space to stop;
- y) Towing crew shall always seek clarification if doubtful of towing instructions;
- z) Towing crew shall inform ACC if they are unable to execute an instruction / face difficulty in executing an instruction.

**Caution: All given instructions must be read back or acknowledged in a manner clearly indicating that they have been understood and will be complied with.**

## 11.2 Role of the Brake Operator

11.2.1 The brake operator shall minimally be trained to:

- a) Be familiar with the airfield layout and to recognise the relevant signages and markings around the airfield;
- b) Be competent in operating the aircraft radio for communication to CAG ACC and Changi Tower as authorised by the airline;
- c) Meet the airline's requirements in operating the aircraft's system to fulfil the brake operator role. This can include but not limited to the aircraft radio communication system and electrical system.

11.2.2 The brake operator shall minimally fulfil the following roles:

- a) Be responsible for communication with CAG ACC and Changi Tower;
- b) Complete a flight deck checklist for towing (refer to the operating airline's GOM);
- c) Ensure all aircraft doors are closed;
- d) Communicate airtug transponder ID as part of the tow request to CAG ACC and Changi Tower;
- e) Contact ATC for clearance to start moving the aircraft;

- f) Apply the “Brakes On” and “Brakes off” procedures in accordance with the headset operator;
- g) Switch on and off the external and anti-collision lights of the aircraft;
- h) Position the seat in such a way that the brakes can be easily applied when required;
- i) Inform the headset operator immediately if potential conflict with any object(s) is detected;
- j) Only apply the brakes during the tow when instructed by the headset operator or when it is clear that the aircraft has become separated from the tractor.

Note: The above roles may be fulfilled by more than one operator in the cockpit based on airline’s arrangement.

### 11.3 Towing Requirements

- a) When towing an aircraft into the designated stand, check that there is no FOD in the ERA and KCZ. The surface condition shall be safe for flight operations;
- b) Prior to commencement of a towing operation, carry out a pre-departure walk in accordance with Section 10.1.2 and establish communications between the airtug operator and the flight crew and/or brake operator;
- c) Brake operator to give permission to connect the towbar and airtug after applying the aircraft parking brake;
- d) Ensure hydraulic system pressure for aircraft braking and/or the brake accumulator is within required pressure range;
- e) Ensure any required electrical systems for towing are energized;
- f) Ensure all gear lock safety pins/sleeves are installed, and after tow, ensure all pins are removed and stowed;
- g) Insert the steering bypass pin and deactivate steering;
- h) Ensure that the brake operator in the cockpit is qualified;
- i) Establish communication with the brake operator by means of the interphone system;
- j) Ensure that wheel chocks are positioned at the end of the manoeuvre, prior to disconnecting the towbar-less airtug or tow bar.

**Caution: Inform the brake operator / flight crew and/or contact the maintenance department for technical inspection if you observe any type of excessive fluid leakage; notice any signs of unmarked aircraft damage; observe any fault, failure, malfunction or defect which you believe may affect the safe operation of the aircraft for the intended flight.**

### 11.4 Towing Manoeuvring

11.4.1 The towing manoeuvring procedure is similar for all aircraft types. The following minimum safety precautions and procedures shall be followed prior to and during aircraft towing operations:

- a) Connect the airtug in accordance with the relevant instructions contained in Section 10.3;

- b) Align the towbar-less airtug and tow bar combination to the aircraft centreline before the aircraft movement;
- c) Raise the tow bar wheels completely before the start of aircraft movement (if used);

**Caution: If the headset man is not in the airtug/towbar-less airtug, he shall stay clear of the nose gear when the aircraft is moving and remain clear of the hazard zones during operation and avoid walking backwards when dispatching the aircraft.**

- d) Prior to the aircraft movement, make sure that the parking brakes are released, and the anti-collision lights are switched on;
- e) Wait for the authorization of the flight crew or brake operator before moving the aircraft;
- f) . Start the pushback operation slowly on a straight line;
- g) Keep the manoeuvring speed at minimum and apply the vehicle brakes gently;
- h) Do not exceed the towing speed limit as regulated; 25km/h for towbarless airtug and 15km/h for conventional airtug;
- i) Use relevant apron lines as guidance during manoeuvring to ensure safe obstacle clearance. Be aware of the size of the towed aircraft;
- j) During and completion of pushback, align the aircraft such that the relevant taxiway centreline/pushback line/lead-in line (in accordance with the pushback procedure) is in between the aircraft main landing gears to provide sufficient wing and tail clearance;
- k) Scan the apron during towing and monitor clearances and wing walkers, if used, to ensure the aircraft is moving clear of all obstructions. Be prepared to stop;
- l) Ensure the steering turn limits are not exceeded and advise brake operator and maintenance department if any are exceeded. Damage may occur to the nose gear if steering turn limits are exceeded. Refer to the operating airline's GOM for the specific limits and how they are marked on the aircraft;
- m) Stop 50 metres before a taxiway intersection, if a stop is required;
- n) Avoid sharp turns, which results in excessive tyre scrubbing;
- o) Do not stop abruptly;
- p) When arriving at the allocated position, move the aircraft in a straight line for a few meters to ensure that the nose wheels are in the straight-ahead position. This relieves any tensional stress applied to landing gear components and tyres;

**Caution: If the nose wheels are not in the centered position, they can turn quickly to their centered position when the steering bypass pin is removed. This can result in personnel injury or aircraft damage**

- q) Apply the airtug parking brake after a complete stop;
- r) Headset man shall ensure that the aircraft stops at the designated aircraft-type stop bar;
- s) Upon completion of the towing, headset man shall ensure that chocks are placed at the aircraft wheels and cones placement done in accordance with the airline's requirements or as recommended by IATA (IGOM).

## **11.5 Radio Telephony Failure During Towing**

- 11.5.1 If 3-way communications between cockpit / headset man and airtug / towbarless airtug operator is not established, towing cannot commence. Towing team shall inform CAG ACC to facilitate the tow with a "Follow-Me" car.

## **11.6 Incidents During Towing**

- 11.6.1 The airtug driver and brake operator shall continuously keep each other informed of any incident that happens during towing. Please see table below as reference to the IATA IGOM.


Brake Operator	Airtug Driver
<b><i>VHF Communication Failure</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish alternate means of communication</li> <li>• Request for Follow-Me Service if alternate means of communications cannot be established</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Apply airtug parking brake.</li> </ul>
<b><i>Airtug Failure</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform CAG ACC and Changi Tower.</li> <li>• Apply parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Listen to VHF and wait for assistance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set.</li> <li>• Apply airtug parking brake. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform brake operator.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Chock the aircraft. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b><i>Coupling Break Off</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brake the assembly by stepping on both brake pedals progressively.</li> <li>• As soon as the aircraft is at a standstill, apply the parking brake before releasing the pedal.</li> <li>• Inform CAG ACC and Changi Tower.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform Brake Operator immediately</li> <li>• Do not apply airtug brakes.</li> <li>• Follow the aircraft path attentively and stop the airtug according to the aircraft position.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b><i>Airtug Fire</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform AES and CAG ACC.</li> <li>• Apply parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Determine the need for aircraft emergency evacuation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform the Brake Operator.</li> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Disconnect and move airtug away as rapidly as possible, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Fight the fire, using the fire extinguisher, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact supervisor and control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b><i>Aircraft Fire</i></b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform AES and CAG ACC.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply the parking brake after aircraft/airtug set has come to a stop safely.</li> <li>• Evacuate the aircraft using on-board means, if required.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disconnect and move airtug away as rapidly as possible, if deemed safe to do so.</li> <li>• Chock the aircraft, where possible. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact control centre to advise on the situation, as required.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Accident with Other Aircraft or Vehicle</i></b></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform CAG ACC and Changi Tower.</li> <li>• Listen to VHF and wait for assistance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop aircraft / airtug set immediately.</li> <li>• Apply airtug parking brake.</li> <li>• Inform brake operator.</li> <li>• Contact control centre to advise of the situation, as required.</li> <li>• Do not disconnect the airtug unless specifically instructed to do so by the brake operator.</li> <li>• If disconnecting the airtug, the aircraft must be chocked.</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>Visual Contact with the Wing Walkers and/or Marshaller is Lost (if used)</i></b></p>	
<p>In the event that the airtug driver is unable to establish visual contact with one or both of the wing walkers or the marshaller, when required, the towing operation should be stopped and not recommence until visual contact is reestablished.</p>	

## 12 Aircraft Fuelling

### 12.1 General Safety during Fuelling

12.1.1 The Fuelling Safety Zone (FSZ) is defined as an area of at least 3 metres in any direction from any centre point of all fuel vent exits, refuelling plugs, aircraft refuelling ports, fuel hydrants, fuel hoses and fuelling truck (fuel dispenser).



REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION
A	Aircraft refuelling port/plug
B	Fuel vent exit
C	Fuel hydrant pit
D	Fuel vent exit (according to the aircraft type)
E	Hoses
F	Fuel truck or hydrant dispenser
1	Fuel Truck
2	Hydrant Dispenser

12.1.2 The responsible ground personnel/refuelling operator shall fulfil the following criteria:

- Be issued with a valid ADP to drive and operate that specific equipment type;
- Wears a high visibility safety vest at all times;
- Does NOT smoke during operations;
- Observes ramp safety rules (e.g. No horseplay on the job);
- Observes the danger areas/hazards on the ramp and take the necessary precautions for personnel and aircraft safety;
- Is aware of contacting CAG AMC immediately for any aircraft fuel spillage. Refer to the CAG FSM Chapter 9, on the reporting requirements for aircraft fuel spillages;
- Is aware of the location of the nearest emergency stop button;
- Does not litter or leave any refuse or FOD within the aircraft stand;
- Shall not consume any food or beverage and shall not feed any bird or animal;

- 12.1.3 The fuelling operator shall ensure that the fuelling vehicle:
- a) Is issued with a valid AVP and equipped with a valid fire extinguisher and current inspection tags;
  - b) Has “no smoking” signs on both sides;
  - c) Has externally mounted emergency engine stop controls clearly identified;
  - d) Is fitted with aircraft wing proximity sensors on the elevating platform; and
  - e) Is equipped with spill containment kit.

## **12.2 Fuelling Vehicles Safety Driving & Parking Inside ERA**

- 12.2.1 The following precautions shall be taken when operating fuelling vehicles within the ERA:
- a) Only move fuelling vehicles towards the aircraft when all the following criteria is met:
    - i. Aircraft has come to a complete stop;
    - ii. Engines have been switched off and are spooling down;
    - iii. Anti-collision lights are switched off;
    - iv. Wheel chocks are positioned; and
    - v. Ground/Flight Crew communication has been established and headset man has given the ‘thumbs up’ signal.
  - b) Do not approach the aircraft until all safety cones have been placed;
  - c) Fuelling vehicle is moved forward into fuelling position;
  - d) Do not drive fuelling vehicles more than 5 km per hour;
  - e) Test the brakes as soon as possible and before leaving the depot. Perform brake test before entering ERA. The approach to an aircraft shall be such that collision will be avoided in the event of vehicle brake failure;
  - f) Do not use handheld PEDs (e.g. cell phone, laptops and tablets) when operating vehicles or equipment;
  - g) Do not carry extra personnel during movement of fuelling vehicles unless that person is seated in a passenger seat provided in the vehicle or standing in a section of the vehicle which has been constructed for standing passengers;
  - h) Do not drive the fuelling vehicles across the path of embarking and disembarking passengers. Aircraft passengers always have right of way;
  - i) Check that an unobstructed vehicle escape route is maintained for fuel bowser. An unobstructed vehicle escape route should also be maintained for fuel trucks; and
  - j) Do not leave any vehicle unattended with its engine running.

## **12.3 Pre-fuelling Operations**

- 12.3.1 The fuelling operator shall ensure:
- a) Vehicle stabilisers are fully in contact with the tarmac before mounting on the elevating platform to connect the fuelling hose to aircraft coupling;
  - b) Fuelling vehicle is positioned correctly to ensure that strain is not applied to fuelling hoses when connected to the aircraft;



- c) Bonding/grounding connections are established between fuelling vehicle and aircraft before fuelling operations;
- d) Lanyard connected to the hydrant pit valve is free of obstruction and readily accessible to the fuelling operator and ground personnel; and
- e) Hydrant pit valve is identified by a four-winged flag, cone or equivalent;

## 12.4 Fuelling Operations

### 12.4.1 The fuelling operator shall:

- a) Use hand-held dead man device throughout the operation and remain outside the vehicle cab at all times;
- b) Ensure fuelling hoses have sufficient length to allow the fuelling platform to be fully lowered while hoses/coupling are connected to the aircraft;
- c) Ensure fuelling hoses are not entangled on equipment during movement of fuelling platform;
- d) Ensure that fuelling platform is not raised or lowered when refuelling operations are taking place;
- e) Ensure that fuelling vehicle has interlock mechanisms to prevent vehicle from moving while hoses are connected to the aircraft;
- f) Exercise extreme caution when fuelling an aircraft during lightning and thunderstorms;
- g) Conduct post-fuelling operations 360-degree walk to ensure all hoses are disconnected and stowed correctly; and
- h) Clear FOD if any.

### 12.4.2 The refuelling operator shall shut down the refuelling operation whenever:

- a) Any fuel is discovered to be leaking or spilling from fuel servicing equipment or hoses;
- b) Vehicle drives over any hose or bonding cable laid on the apron used for refuelling aircraft;  
or
- c) Anyone is using PEDs (e.g. cell phone, laptops and tablets) within 3 metres of FSZ when refuelling is in progress, unless such device is intrinsically-safe certified.

**Note: Refuelling operations to be suspended during severe thunderstorms according to respective fuelling companies' guidelines.**

## 12.5 Aircraft Fuel Spillage

- 12.5.1 In the event of an overflow or leakage of fuel, the aircraft fuelling operator shall stop the fuel flow by releasing the Deadman switch and pulling the lanyard to shut off the hydrant pit quick release valve. If necessary, the operator should activate the emergency stop button (ESB).
- 12.5.2 The ESB should be activated only when there is a need to shut down aviation fuel supply to the airport, such as but no limited to, due to uncontrolled fuel spillage or major fire near fuel infrastructure (e.g. fuel pits). The personnel/operator who activated the button should also immediately or as soon as reasonably practical call the CAFHI control room to inform CAFHI of the location and nature of the incident.
- 12.5.3 For any aircraft fuel spillage, please contact CAG AMC immediately. Refer to the CAG FSM Chapter 9, on the reporting requirements for aircraft fuel spillages.

## 12.6 Contingency procedure for unserviceable CAFHI Emergency Stop Buttons

- 12.6.1 CAFHI maintains a network of ESBs around the Changi Airport airside. The ESBs are a safety measure to deactivate the flow of aviation fuel in the event of an uncontrollable fuel spillage or other safety incident that requires fuel supply to be shut off.
- 12.6.2 If a CAFHI ESB is not working and cannot be fixed immediately, CAFHI will display a sign on the relevant ESB to state that it is out of order. The sign will also state the location of the next available ESB(s) with the contact number to call and this sign will be removed once the ESB has been fixed.
- 12.6.3 In the event of an emergency near the out-of-order ESB that requires fuel supply to be shut off, airside users should call the CAFHI control room.
- 12.6.4 Airside users may also choose to activate the nearest available working ESB as indicated on the sign. A sample of the sign that CAFHI will display is provided below.

### Samples of CAFHI sign to notify users of out-of-order emergency stop buttons



## 13 Training & Competency of Personnel of Ground Service Providers

### 13.1 Introduction

- 13.1.1 The objective of training is to ensure that personnel are equipped with the requisite skills, knowledge and attitude to complete their tasks in a safe and efficient manner. This includes GSE maintenance activities which should only be delivered by personnel who are technically competent and proficient.
- 13.1.2 To ensure safety, quality and proficiency on the airside, GSPs shall minimally cover all the safety standards and procedures stated in this Ground Operations Safety Manual (GOSM) that are relevant to the job scope of the operator.
- 13.1.3 General safety guidelines as stated in Chapter 5 of GOSM and human factors topics such as communication, stress, fatigue and situational awareness should be included.
- 13.1.4 Safety training programme shall be made available to personnel and contractors performing one or more of the following functions at the airside:
- a) Ground handling operations;
  - b) Line maintenance;
  - c) Operation of vehicles and GSE;
  - d) Refuelling;
  - e) Supervision of ground handling operations.
- 13.1.5 The safety training programme shall minimally cover the following topics:
- a) Safety Regulations
    - a. Airside regulations;
    - b. Safe working and operating procedures.
  - b) Hazards
    - a. Aircraft and vehicle movements;
    - b. Aircraft fuelling and fuel spills;
    - c. Adverse weather conditions;
    - d. Jet blasts;
    - e. Key risks (e.g., ERA infringements; failure to give way to aircraft when crossing taxiways).
  - c) Human Factors
    - a. Complacency;
    - b. Distraction;
    - c. Fatigue;
    - d. Lack of assertiveness;
    - e. Lack of awareness;
    - f. Lack of communication;
    - g. Lack of knowledge;
    - h. Lack of resources;
    - i. Lack of teamwork;
    - j. Norms;

- k. Pressure;
  - l. Stress.
- d) Airside Markings and Signage
  - a. Aircraft parking stands;
  - b. Roadways;
  - c. Taxiways and runways (if applicable).
- e) Foreign Object Debris (FOD)
  - a. Be aware of the different types of FOD and the potential hazards posed by FOD;
  - b. FOD prevention;
  - c. How to report FOD;
  - d. FOD removal where possible and feasible.
- f) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
  - a. Hi-visibility safety vest;
  - b. Protective gear.
- g) Emergency Situations and Reporting Procedures
  - a. Fuel/hydraulic spillage;
  - b. Vehicular incident/accident;
  - c. Aircraft incident/accident (suspected/confirmed).

#### 13.1.6 Functional Safety Training Programme

13.1.6.1 Personnel shall, as appropriate to their job function, receive training on the following applicable subjects:

- a) Aircraft Handling and Loading
  - a. Operating procedures;
  - b. Aircraft movement operations;
  - c. Securing of load, ULD, pallet/container dollies and baggage trolleys;
  - d. Docking and operation of equipment;
  - e. Handling of safety equipment (i.e. safety cones and chocks);
  - f. Reporting and removal of unserviceable equipment.
- b) Aircraft Ground Movement
  - a. Operating procedures;
  - b. Aircraft movement operations;
  - c. Operation of equipment including (dis)connection procedures;
  - d. Airfield layout signage and markings;
  - e. Standard phraseology.
- c) Passenger Loading Bridge
  - a. Operating procedures;
  - b. Emergency switches and cut-offs.
- d) Aircraft Docking Guidance System/Marshalling
  - a. Operating procedures;
  - b. Use of Aircraft Docking Guidance System;
  - c. Hand signals.
- e) Refuelling
  - a. Operating procedures;

b. Safety during aircraft refuelling.

13.1.7 Definitions:


- 13.1.7.1 Initial training – the set of training (theory and/or practical) and assessments to be completed successfully, prior to being assigned to perform new duties and operational functions.
- 13.1.7.2 Recurrent/refresher training/assessment – the set of training (theory and/or practical) or assessment, that shall be completed prior to the current expiry date of training currency.
- 13.1.7.3 Update training – the set of training (theory and/or practical) and assessment, to be provided to staff when there are significant changes to the operating environment, infrastructure or equipment changes.
- 13.1.7.4 Requalification training – the set of training (theory and/or practical) and assessment to be given to the staff when he/she is no longer meeting the performance standard, or who has been absent from their operational role for a prolonged period.

## 13.2 Training Management System

- 13.2.1 Training Management System shall clearly document training accountabilities, responsibilities, policies, standards and tasks throughout the company for training effectiveness. Each GSP shall appoint person(s) responsible for the Training Management System, to ensure proper documentation, periodic reviews, updates, maintenance and dissemination of training material. Changes to processes or equipment shall be communicated to relevant personnel and appropriate additional information and training shall be delivered.
- 13.2.2 Within the Training Management System, there shall be clear policies, standards and procedures related to:
  - a) Design, development, and delivery of training content;
  - b) Measurement of training effectiveness through theory, practical and checkout assessments;
  - c) Recourse actions for when an employee does not achieve the required standard of knowledge or competence, or involved in incidents due failure to comply to SOP;
  - d) Development of a process for update training;
  - e) Process to track training currency and compliance. This includes ensuring staff attends recurrent training before the lapse of training currency and only trained personnel are deployed for operations;
  - f) Maintenance of updated documentation and training records;
  - g) Development and maintenance of competencies necessary for trainer, on-job-trainer and assessor;

h) Development of a backup plan for training during crisis.

### 13.3 Structure



- 13.3.1 An initial training consisting of theoretical and practical elements, as appropriate to the role, shall be provided to the trainee. It shall include theory lessons and theory assessment. For operational functions, the initial training shall also include practical and practical assessment.
- 13.3.2 Only upon the completion of the initial training and passing all necessary assessments, can the training progress to the on-job-training phase.
- 13.3.3 Other initial training courses may be assigned to the trainee depending on company and airline requirement.
- 13.3.4 Theory training focuses on delivering the knowledge required for the task. GSPs are encouraged to adopt a variety of methods and media to enable learning. In addition, theory training should include case studies to reiterate learning lessons from past incidents (local and/or overseas). Theory training shall also include the handling of unusual scenarios.
- 13.3.5 Practical training should consist of the varied scenarios realistically possible and ensure that trainee(s) are exposed to these scenarios before being subjected to the practical assessment. Considerations include the aircraft type served, equipment type, operating environment, time of day, etc.
- 13.3.6 All matters related to initial training shall be documented.

#### **13.4 Assessments**

- 13.4.1 GSP shall have in policy, the maximum number of tries a trainee has at each stage of training, and the recourse actions available at each stage of training during the event of failure.
- 13.4.2 All matters related to assessment shall be documented and recorded accordingly.

##### **13.4.3 Theory Assessment**

- 13.4.3.1 There shall be a theory assessment conducted for all functional trainings, with a minimum passing grade of 80%.
- 13.4.3.2 Errors should be reviewed post- assessment to correct any knowledge gap.
- 13.4.3.3 There shall be dedication of documented questioning of trainee for unusual scenarios handling.

##### **13.4.4 Practical Assessment**

- 13.4.4.1 There shall be a practical assessment conducted at the end of the practical training before trainee is evaluated to be fit for on-job-training. This assessment shall be conducted with a standardized and controlled checklist. The trainee shall be able to perform the task without error to be deemed competent.

13.4.4.2 The practical assessment shall be conducted under commonly faced operational scenarios. Where deemed beneficial, the assessment can be done in parts to ensure sufficient coverage. E.g., assessment for Headset can include for arrival flight handling, departure flight handling, towing, and full ground support.

#### **13.4.5 OJT Checkout Assessment**

13.4.5.1 There shall be a checkout assessment conducted at the end of the OJT period before trainee is assessed to be fit for operational deployment. This assessment shall be conducted with a standardized and controlled checklist for each task. The trainee shall only be certified competent upon achieving an error free operational assessment.

13.4.5.2 The assessor should not be the trainer or on-job-trainer or mentor(s) of the trainee.

### **13.5 On-Job Training Requirements**

13.5.1 Only trainees who have assessed to have passed both theory and practical assessment, shall be sent for on-job training segment.

13.5.2 GSPs should evaluate for mentor-mentee fit during pairing.

13.5.3 GSPs shall set clear minimal number of flights that a trainee shall undergo during OJT before being sent for checkout assessment. GSPs should also include other aspects such as day/night difference, aircraft type difference, equipment brand difference, weather difference, etc., in the selection of scenario types that the trainee should undergo with a mentor, before sending the trainee for checkout assessment.

13.5.4 There shall be clear processes for mentor, trainee, or other relevant personnel such as operations supervisor (or equivalent), trainer or assessor, to provide feedback and/or extend the OJT period for trainee to gain competence and confidence. This shall not be deemed punitive in any way.

13.5.5 During checkout assessment, the assessor should not be the trainee's trainer or mentor.

13.5.6 Trainees shall achieve an error-free independently completed assessment before any decision for competence is made. An OJT checkout assessment may be completed in parts, depending on the role the trainee is assessed for. The decision for competence shall include a holistic consideration of knowledge, skills and personnel readiness (e.g., confidence).

13.5.7 GSPs shall have clear recourse actions should the trainee not pass the checkout assessment.



## **13.6 Recurrent/Refresher Training and/or Assessment Requirements**

13.6.1 Under clearly defined training policy, GSP shall clearly state whether recurrent training or recurrent assessment would be provided for the different operational roles, and what is the frequency of each.

13.6.2 The GSP shall have a system and process to track all personnel training records and validity of training currency and ensure only trained personnel are deployed for operations.

13.6.3 In the event of a lapse of training currency due prolonged absence, refer to 13.8, and in the event of lapse of training currency due to inability to meet performance standard, refer to 13.7.

### **13.6.4 Recurrent Training**

13.6.4.1 Recurrent training includes assessment of theoretical knowledge and/or practical competencies appropriate to the role and operational requirements. It shall be delivered by the GSP at a specified frequency but not exceeding 36 months from the completion of the previous training.

13.6.4.2 Recurrent training need not be a replica of the initial course. GSPs are encouraged to adopt a risk-based approach to assess the elements that are required to be included during the recurrent training.

13.6.4.3 All matters related to recurrent training shall be documented.

### **13.6.5 Recurrent Assessment**

13.6.5.1 Recurrent assessment is an acceptable alternative to recurrent training, but it shall take place within 36 months of the previous training and/or assessment, and it may be more frequent if an employer identifies a trend or need that requires action.

13.6.5.2 Recurrent assessment shall include theory assessment, behavioral observation of the task, assessment of the task performance and a debrief upon completion. The passing criteria would be the same as the initial training.

13.6.5.3 It is recommended for the practical aspect of recurrent assessment to be conducted unannounced to the staff.

13.6.5.4 Where a staff's recurrent assessment is found to be unsatisfactory, the GSP should determine the contributing factors and provide appropriate interventions and recourse actions for the staff to regain currency.

13.6.5.5 All matters related to recurrent assessment shall be documented.

### 13.7 Requalification Training

13.7.1 Where a staff is found to be no longer meeting the performance standard, requalification training shall be provided.

13.7.2 Requalification training shall address the identified gaps in performance and close the gap(s) before returning the staff to operational duties and all such process shall be documented.

### 13.8 Absence from Work

13.8.1 Each GSP shall have a requalification process for staff and contractors who are absent from operational duties for a defined period of time. The purpose is to ensure the competency of staff/sub-contractors prior to redeployment. GSPs may take reference from the relevant IATA materials to design their requalification training programme, with the following table as an example that is extracted from IATA Airport Handling Manual Edition 45.

Period of Absence	Action
Up to 3 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief the employee on any procedural, organizational or equipment/infrastructure updates or changes that might have occurred during their absence.</li> <li>The briefing shall be documented and filed accordingly. It may include an assessment if deemed required by the company.</li> </ul>
Over 3 and up to 12 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief the employee on any procedural, organizational or equipment/infrastructure updates or changes that might have occurred during their absence.</li> <li>The briefing shall be documented and filed accordingly. Additionally, deliver on-the-job training and assessment to ensure competence has been maintained.</li> <li>Should any gaps in competence be identified, a period of requalification training shall be initiated.</li> </ul>
Over 12 and up to 24 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Brief the employee on any procedural, organizational or equipment/infrastructure updates or changes that might have occurred during their absence.</li> <li>The briefing shall be documented and filed accordingly.</li> <li>Deliver requalification training (See <a href="#">Section 4.4.6</a>) as required, including a documented, formal assessment of competence, as per initial training, to confirm the employee remains competent to perform that role.</li> </ul>
More than 24 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial training program(s) to be delivered.</li> </ul>

### 13.9 Review and Update of Training Program and Materials

13.9.1 The training program and materials shall be reviewed annually and as necessary, using a checklist with appropriate documentation controls, to ensure that it remains updated vis-à-vis internal and regulatory requirements and meet the needs of users.

13.9.2 The outcome of the review may result in no change to the training program and/or materials. The review process shall be documented.

13.9.3 With each update and review, for critical changes e.g., changes in processes, equipment, operating environment, etc., GSP shall ensure relevant personnel are updated without waiting for them to attend the periodic recurrent training.

### **13.10 Training Program Effectiveness Evaluation**

13.10.1 GSP shall evaluate the effectiveness of its training programs. This can come in the form of knowledge gained, skills gained and behavioral changes.

13.10.2 GSP shall document the evaluation process. This may be in the form of questionnaire post-theory training, focus group discussions, turnaround checks or other operational observations.

13.10.3 Periodic review of these evaluations shall be made and documented. The outcome of the review may result in no change to the training program.

### **13.11 Experienced Hires Management**

13.11.1 Where GSP employs individuals with prior ground handling experience, the GSP is responsible for ensuring they still receive the necessary training and assessment for them to operate safely in Changi Airside.

13.11.2 Should the GSP evaluate that the staff need not undergo the full suite of training, such decisions must be evaluated from a risk angle and all evaluations and approvals shall be clearly documented and by suitable persons.

13.11.3 All experienced hires must satisfactorily pass all theory, practical and OJT checkout assessments before being allowed to be deployed for operations.

### **13.12 Exception Handling**

13.12.1 Where a trainee shows readiness for an earlier assessment of competencies during theory or practical or checkout assessment, decisions shall be documented with clear details supporting the decisions.

13.12.2 For OJT checkout assessment, a minimal number of flights shall remain mandatory before an early checkout assessment can be done. This decision shall be evaluated and documented.

### **13.13 Documentation**

13.13.1 The GSP shall be able to demonstrate that all relevant SOPs have been suitably translated into training materials for effective delivery to the staff. The training materials should also include risk communication components whenever applicable, to ensure staff are aware of the risk and hazards involved when certain procedures or steps are not being followed.

13.13.2 All training programmes shall be documented including:

a) The initial courses necessary per each job role, in the form of a training matrix, matching the training requirements against job roles within different functions;

b) Within each course, it shall be detailed on the:

- i. Training objectives, learning outcomes and training content;
- ii. Initial and recurrent training content, methodology and duration;
- iii. Recurrent training frequency

c) Assessment methodology at each stage and the passing criteria within each stage (e.g., theory, practical, OJT checkout).

13.13.3 The GSP shall have a system in place for the retention of training records for a period stipulated by the GSP.

13.13.4 All training, assessments and competencies shall be documented in a timely and consistent manner.

13.13.5 The record shall identify:

- a) Employer name or logo;
- b) Trainee name and unique ID number;
- c) Title of training;
- d) Required pass mark or percentage;
- e) Actual test mark or percentage achieved as evidence that competence is achieved;
- f) Date of training (start and end);
- g) Validity period;
- h) Trainer/Assessor name as appropriate.

The record shall be endorsed by the trainer to confirm that they have delivered the training, as well as by the trainee to acknowledge that they have received the training and understood the content.

### **13.14 Competency of Trainer, Assessor, On-Job Training Mentor**

- 13.14.1 A trainer, when certified competent, shall be able to deliver theoretical and practical training sessions. An assessor, when certified competent, shall be able to assess trainees and certify them to be competent. An OJT Mentor, when certified competent, shall be responsible for the mentoring of OJT trainees.
- 13.14.2 It shall be clearly documented who are the qualified personnel under each category, and the recency of their qualifications.
- 13.14.3 GSP shall clearly document the initial prerequisites and continuing qualifications necessary for each of the three roles. It shall be ensured that trainers, assessors and OJT mentors are kept current. Criteria can include completion of official training course(s) by external or internal providers, minimum experience level, safety performance records, interpersonal and communication skills, and any other criteria deemed necessary.
- 13.14.4 Trainers, assessors and OJT mentors shall also be subjected to a framework to be defined by GSP on the necessary requalification steps should they have prolonged absence from their operational role.
- 13.14.5 Trainers, assessors, and OJT mentors should be subjected to a stricter requalification process to be defined by the GSP, should they be found to be involved in any form of incidents involving willful non-compliance of SOP.
- 13.14.6 Trainers, assessors and OJT mentors shall keep themselves current in the subjects that they are required to conduct training/assessment/mentoring on. The GSP shall provide these personnel with the necessary update training, briefings, etc., where needed.

**13.15 Additional Requirements for Operators operating the Aircraft Docking Guidance System (ADGS), performing Manual Marshalling and operating the Passenger Boarding Bridge.**

13.15.1 Operators shall have experience operating the ADGS and conducting manual marshalling on live flights under trainer or mentor supervision before operating independently.

13.15.2 Operators who are qualified to operate the ADGS and conduct manual marshalling shall undergo recurrent training every two (2) years.

13.15.3 All PLB operators must be licensed by CAG to operate the PLB and hold a valid Class 'A' ADP. Operators shall be conversant with emergency procedures and comply with SOPs located next to all PLB consoles and other instructions which may be issued by CAG. Operators are to use the "Auto-Dock" function of the PLB console, if the PLB console is equipped with this function.

13.15.4 Operators who are qualified to operate the PLB shall undergo refresher courses every two (2) years and get their Class "A" renewed with ADC. All training records shall be retained by the GSP and provided to CAG upon request.

### **13.16 Contractors' Training Requirements**

13.16.1 The GSP shall ensure that all contractors involved with ground handling activities that interface with the aircraft and/or, handle Ground Support Equipment (GSE) are subjected to the following training program structure as listed in 13.2 to 13.7. This would include contractors deploying guardrails and opening/closing of cargo/cabin doors.

13.16.2 There shall be theory training, practical training with assessment and an OJT phase with a final checkout assessment. The training of these contractors shall minimally be under close oversight by the GSP, and is strongly recommended to be provided for by trainers of the GSP.

13.16.3 GSP remains responsible for training outsourced to trainers within the contractor's company and the GSP shall provide necessary training materials that are updated, and other necessary resources, to ensure training quality is not compromised.

13.16.4 For training outsourced to trainers within the contractor's company, the GSP shall establish pre-requisites for the selection and continual assessment of the suitability of these trainers.

13.16.5 The conduct of training and assessment shall be aligned with the requirements mentioned in 13.3 and 13.4.

13.16.6 For OJT phase, the GSP shall provide oversight on the selection of mentors and provide necessary checklist and other materials, to ensure quality of OJT completed.

13.16.7 The final checkout phase shall be conducted by the GSP's assessors.

13.16.8 For all other contractors involved in ground handling activities that are not covered under 13.16.1, these contractors shall minimally undergo the equivalent of an airside safety theory course (covering topics listed within 13.1.5) conducted by the GSP, and an on-site familiarization conducted by a suitable person of the GSP. *If the functional training for these areas are undertaken by the contractors, the GSP shall retain oversight of all other functional training.*

13.16.9 GSP shall remain responsible to ensure that contractors training currency is valid, and that only those with valid training currency are deployed for operations.

13.16.10 For the delivery of recurrent training, update training and other related training elements, refer to earlier sub-sections.

## **14 Ground Support Equipment Maintenance Programme**

### **14.1 General**

- 14.1.1 A GSE is any piece of mobile equipment, whether or not powered or self-propelled, that is designed, built and used for ground handling, servicing or field maintenance of aircraft on the ramp.
- 14.1.2 The GSP shall have a maintenance programme that ensures that GSEs remain safe to operate and in good condition. The GSP shall have a system in place that prevents operation of any equipment that is not deemed to be in a safe and serviceable condition.
- 14.1.3 If the GSP outsources the maintenance functions to external organisations, the GSP retains overall responsibility of such functions, and must demonstrate processes for monitoring the applicable external organisations.

### **14.2 Maintenance Programme**

- 14.2.1 The GSP shall ensure that the maintenance programme includes the following:
- a) Preventive maintenance that is conducted minimally in accordance with OEM requirements;
  - b) Corrective maintenance; and
  - c) Any components installed for the purpose of satisfying the Aircraft Damage Prevention Requirements (ADPR) shall be incorporated within periodic preventive maintenance to ensure serviceability.

Note: Preventive maintenance aims to avoid breakdowns and is a set of checks independent of daily pre-use checks.



#### 14.2.2 Periodic checks/servicing

14.2.2.1 Inspection should be performed to ensure serviceability of the equipment, including necessary servicing and/or replacement of components. These components should include components installed for the purpose of compliance to Aircraft Damage Prevention Requirements (ADPR).

14.2.3 GSP should trend usage, breakdown and maintenance data so as to provide an informed feedback loop into the management of its GSE fleet, e.g., whether shorter maintenance interval is necessary or a fleet renewal should be considered, etc.

14.2.4 The GSP shall have in place a defect reporting process, including corrective action plans to address GSE faults.

#### 14.2.5 Documentation

14.2.5.1 The GSP shall ensure that maintenance records are retained according to the stipulated period by the GSP.

14.2.5.2 GSP should also trend repair and maintenance data.

#### 14.2.6 Treatment of Unserviceable GSE

14.2.6.1 The GSP shall ensure that unserviceable GSE is removed from operations for repair and/or maintenance. The unserviceable GSE shall be tagged with easily noticeable 'out of service' markers to ensure it is not being used for operations.

### 14.3 Fire Protection

14.3.1 Fire is one of the most dangerous threats to an aircraft. GSPs shall ensure that GSEs are equipped with fire protection systems (e.g. fire extinguishers). Such systems shall be checked for correct working pressure, servicing period validity, and overall serviceability.

14.3.2 GSPs shall ensure that serviceable fire extinguisher(s) is/are in easily accessible location(s) such as on a suitable bracket securely affixed on the exterior.

14.3.3 GSPs should ensure for elevating equipment such as Hi-Lift, a fire extinguisher is available within the vanbody.

**Note: Operators shall not leave equipment unattended with engine running (with the exception of GPU).**

## **14.4 Grounded GSE**

- 14.4.1 GSP shall have a storage and return to service plan for GSE which have been suspended from operational use. The purpose is to ensure the serviceability of these suspended GSE before returning them back to operations. GSP may take reference from the relevant IATA materials to design their maintenance programme.

## **15 Contractor Management**

### **15.1 General**

- 15.1.1 Contractor management is the managing of outsourced work performed for an individual company.
- 15.1.2 If any part of the ground handling functions is outsourced to an external third-party, i.e. contractors, the GSP shall establish direct oversight-to ensure that the function is conducted safely. GSP shall at all times remain responsible for the behaviour and actions of the contractor and its staff who are acting on its behalf.
- 15.1.3 All safety information and relevant operational information promulgated by CAG must also be disseminated to the GSP's contractors.
- 15.1.4 The GSP shall ensure that all contractors are trained before deployment. There shall be a process to monitor the training quality and currency. There shall be a process to monitor the training records and ensure timely attendance of necessary refresher training. The oversight shall be undertaken by the GSP and not be delegated to the contractor.
- 15.1.5 The GSP shall always maintain an updated list of contractors and provide them to CAG upon request.
- 15.1.6 The GSP shall inform CAG at least two weeks in advance of any planned changes in contractor(s) or deployment of existing contractor(s), along with reasons for the change/deployment.
- 15.1.7 In the event of abrupt cessation of contractor services, GSP shall inform CAG immediately along with reasons for the cessation.

## ANNEX I - IMPORTANT CONTACT INFORMATION

### CONTACT INFORMATION



Airside Control Centre

65412151



Airport Information

65956868



Airside Management Centre

65412275/2273

*To report Airside incident /  
accident*



Medical Emergency

65432223



Fault Management Centre

65412424

*To report building fault and  
hazard*



Fire Safety

65412535

To report fire safety concerns



Airport Police

6546 0000



Airport Emergency Services

6541 2525



CAFHI

6546 4316

## **ANNEX II - AIRCRAFT MARSHALLING SIGNALS**

Give marshaling hand signals from a position in front of the aircraft when facing and within view of the flight crew.

Use illuminated flashlights/wands to improve the visibility of the hand signals in the following situations:

- Insufficient apron lighting
- Poor visibility
- Night conditions
- When required by local airport authorities or regulations

**Note: Please refer to IATA IGOM latest edition for guidance on Aircraft Marshalling Signals.**

## ANNEX III - AIRCRAFT ENGINE RUN-UP


### 1 Conditions and Responsibilities for Engine Run at Aircraft Stands

- 1.1 Aircraft engine run-up on the aircraft stands including the engine run-up stands is subject to approval from CAG ACC.
- 1.2 It is the responsibility of the person conducting the engine run-up to ensure all equipment, vehicles and personnel are well clear of the slipstream and blast areas prior to commencement of and during the run-up. The run shall be discontinued when any movement, including aircraft, behind the aircraft conducting the run is detected. In addition, personnel are also to ensure the following during the engine run-up:
- a) The aircraft wheels are adequately chocked, and the aircraft cannot move forward under any circumstances;
  - b) Where the engine run is carried out at the contact gates, the PLB shall be retracted from the aircraft;
  - c) The aircraft anti-collision lights are activated and remain on during the entire ground run period;
  - d) The engine run is carried out in accordance to the permitted duration and power (e.g. idle power); and
  - e) All the safety cones around the aircraft shall be removed before conducting the aircraft engine run-up.
- 1.3 When ready to start, the person intending to conduct the engine run-up shall call CAG ACC for approval on radio frequency VHF 121.9 MHz and thereafter, maintain a continuous listening watch until the engine run-up operation is completed.
- 1.4 The Duty Airside Controller may, even after approval has been granted, request the engine run-up to be discontinued if other operations of the airport are affected.

### 2 **Location of Engine Run-up**

- 2.1 Subject to the approval from CAG ACC, engine run may be carried out at the following aircraft stands at Changi Airport:
- (a) Contact gates – idle power engine run on one engine for up to **5** minutes only;
  - (b) Remote stands except stands 400 to 404 – idle power engine run up to **5** minutes only;
  - (c) Remote stands 400 to 404 – idle power permitted up to **5** minutes provided there is no aircraft parked at aircraft stands D41 to D47;

- (d) Engine run-up stands 606 and 609 – up to take-off power engine run for all aircraft types.



Please refer to the above diagram on the ground markings for positioning the nose wheel for the various aircraft types operating into Changi to conduct engine ground runs.

### 3 Read back of Engine Run Approval

- 3.1 The person conducting the engine run-up is required to read back the approval granted by Airside Control Centre. The read back is deemed to be his acknowledgement for the approval and condition of the run-up granted and his acceptance of the conditions and responsibilities stated in the paragraphs above.

### 4 Safety measures before and during engine run at 609

- 4.1 Prior to commencement of aircraft engine run, the Engineer responsible for the engine run shall turn on the anemometer to check the wind speed and direction to confirm that the wind direction indicator does not fall within the coloured zones as indicated on the anemometer.

- 4.2 In the event that the wind direction falls within the coloured zones and the wind speed exceeds the limit indicated, the red warning light will be activated. The engineer shall then reduce engine power to idle or lower and inform ACC on the change in engine power.

## **ANNEX IV - COMPASS SWING CALIBRATION (CSC) CHECK**

### **1 Introduction**

1.1 The compass swing calibration (CSC) site is located on taxiway P behind stands 304 and 305 has been in operation since 10 April 2004. Please refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2 for the layout of the CSC site.

1.2 Airlines, aircraft operators and handling agents are to note that Runway 1 (02L/20R) is closed for scheduled preventive maintenance works every Monday and Thursday between 0100LT and 0500LT. During this period, the CSC site would not be available for use.

1.3 In view of the opening of Code F aircraft stands ~~951~~, 953 and 954 on 14 June 2023, there is further restriction to the use of the CSC site.

### **2 Operating Hours of the CSC**

2.1 The use of the CSC is permitted only between 0200LT and 0600LT. However, CAG Airside Control Centre (ACC) reserves the right to approve any slots during the above time frame.

### **3 Advance Booking**

3.1 Airlines, aircraft operators and handling agents are to provide at least 3 working days' notice in writing to CAG Airside Control Centre for booking of the CSC site. Urgent requests with at least 1 working days' notice in writing would be facilitated on a case-by-case basis.

3.2 Booking for the CSC site is subjected to acceptance by CAAS Changi Tower and CAG ACC.

3.3 Airlines, aircraft operators and handling agents are to call CAG ACC at least 24 hrs before the planned compass swing check to confirm acceptance of the booking.

### **4 Towing of Aircraft to CSC Site**

4.1 The flight deck crew is to contact CAG ACC on radio frequency VHF 121.9 MHz for approval to tow the aircraft to the CSC site.

4.2 CAG ACC will then relay the towing request to Changi Tower for them to review and advise the appropriate GMC frequency for tow crew to call.

4.3 Changi Tower will give the details of the ground frequency for the flight deck crew to call. CAG ACC will then convey the ground frequency to the flight deck crew. The flight deck crew is to call the relevant Ground Movement Controller (GMC) for the towing clearance to the CSC site.

### **5 Closure of Taxiway P**

5.1 Upon reaching the CSC site on taxiway P, the towing crew shall hold the aircraft with its nose wheel at the stop line position marked as 'END OF TOW (For CSC)' on the centreline of taxiway P between Q1 and taxilane Q3, depending on its direction of tow.

5.2 The towing crew shall inform Changi Tower GMC that the aircraft has stopped at the designated stop-bar position on the CSC site and request for permission to close Taxiway P between junction of P/Q1 and P/Q3 before commencement of compass swing operation.

5.3 Upon receiving the taxiway closure clearance from Changi Tower GMC, the flight deck crew shall instruct the ground crew to close the portion of Taxiway P between Taxilane Q1 and Taxilane Q3 for the compass swing calibration activity.

5.4 The ground crew is to place an obstruction marker on each of the stop lines before intersections of the Taxiways Q1/P and Q3/P.

5.5 Each obstruction marker shall consist of:

(a) A safety cone of at least 0.5m in height and red, orange or yellow or any one of these colours in combination with white;

(b) A chequered flag of at least 0.5m square and red, orange or yellow or anyone of these colours in combination with white mounted on the safety cone;

(c) A fixed red light with no less than 10cd of red light mounted in a conspicuous position on the safety cone.

5.6 The flight deck crew is to maintain continuous listening watch on VHF 121.9 MHz throughout the compass swing calibration activity.

5.7 The flight deck crew shall also ensure that continuous communication link is established with the ground crew and the airtug driver throughout the compass swing calibration activity.

## **6 Closure of Taxiway P**

6.1 The portion of taxiway P between taxilane Q1 and taxilane Q3 shall be deemed closed once permission has been granted by CAG ACC to commence compass swing calibration checks.

## **7 Wide bodied aircraft (\*Code E or \*Code F) carrying out CSC activity on Taxiway P**

### **7.1 Aircraft movement on Taxiway N**

7.1.1 When a Code E aircraft is carrying out the compass swing within the calibration site, only aircraft types up to Code E can taxi on Taxiway N.

7.1.2 If a Code F aircraft is required to taxi on Taxiway N when a Code E aircraft is conducting compass swing calibration checks, CAG ACC will notify the flight deck crew.

7.1.3 The flight deck crew shall THEN inform the ground crew to pull over the nose wheel of the aircraft to the stop line marked 'INTERIM NOSE WHEEL HOLDING' on the semi-circle closer to the aircraft stands 304 and 305, to maintain maximum separation from Taxiway N.



7.1.4 When a Code F aircraft is carrying out the compass swing within the calibration site, Code E and Code F aircraft are not allowed to taxi on Taxiway N.

7.1.5 When a Code F aircraft is conducting compass swing calibration check, CAG ACC will notify the flight deck crew if there is Code E or F aircraft movement on Taxiway N.

7.1.6 The flight deck crew shall THEN inform the ground crew to pull over the nose wheel of the aircraft to the stop line marked 'INTERIM NOSE WHEEL HOLDING' on the semi-circle closer to the aircraft stands 304 and 305, in order to maintain maximum separation from Taxiway N.

## 8 Aircraft pushback restrictions from aircraft stands 953 and 954.

8.1 Do note that both Code E and Code F aircraft are not permitted to push back from aircraft stands 953 and 954 when CSC site is used by Code E or Code F aircraft.

8.2 Please see the summary of the safety separation on aircraft carrying out compass swing calibration and aircraft taxiing along Taxiway N.

AIRCRAFT TYPE IN CSC SITE	SAFETY SEPARATION FROM A CODE E* AIRCRAFT ON TAXIWAY N	SAFETY SEPARATION FROM A CODE F* AIRCRAFT ON TAXIWAY N
CODE E*	YES	NO
CODE F*	NO	NO

\*Code E: aircraft with wingspan from 52m till 64.99m [e.g.: B744, B77W, A359]

\*Code F: aircraft with wingspan from 65m till 79.99m [e.g.: A380, B748]

8.3 Airlines, aircraft operators and handling agents shall be aware that the compass swing calibration activity may be subjected to disruptions from time to time, due to aircraft movements on Taxiway N.

## 9 Compass Swing Operations

9.1 It is the responsibility of the towing crew to ensure that:

- (i) The aircraft does not collide with any aircraft or vehicles during the process of towing and during the CSC operations; and
- (ii) The CSC site is cleared of obstructions prior to commencing the compass swing calibration check.

9.2 The towing crew shall also ensure that the tow tug adheres strictly to the circle (marked in broken white lines) in order to ensure that the towed aircraft is cleared of the aircraft parked on stand 303 and 306.

9.3 The towing crew shall maintain continuous listening watch on the relevant GMC frequency including VHF 121.9 MHz throughout its compass swing calibration check.

9.4 The towing crew shall also ensure that continuous communication link is established between the engineer in the cockpit and the tow-tug driver throughout the compass swing calibration check.

## **10 Completion of Compass Swing Operation**


10.1 Upon completion of the compass swing calibration activity, the ground crew shall perform FOD sweep of the taxiway to ensure no debris are left behind during the calibration and position the aircraft back onto the centreline of Taxiway P between Taxiway Q1 and Taxilane Q3, before informing CAG ACC on VHF 121.9MHz.

10.2 CAG ACC will then convey the ground frequency to the flight deck crew. The flight deck crew is to call the relevant GMC for removal of the obstruction markers and clearance to tow out from the CSC site. The direction which the aircraft is facing (East or West) should be reported when requesting for towing clearance.


10.3 Please contact Syed Ibrahim at [syed.ibrahim@changiairport.com](mailto:syed.ibrahim@changiairport.com) for further queries and clarifications.

10.4 This writeup closes Airside Operations Notice No.38/2023 dated 16 July 2023.

**Figure 1 – HOLDING POSITION PENDING START OF COMPASS SWING**



**Figure 2 - INTERIM HOLDING POSITION  
TO GIVE WAY TO AIRCRAFT ON TAXIWAY N**



**Reference to the RED BOX in diagram of Figure 1**



**Reference to the RED BOX in diagram of Figure 2**



# **ANNEX V – GENERAL GUIDELINES & REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTERIOR WASHING OF AIRCRAFT IN CHANGI AIRPORT**

## **1 Introduction**

1.1 To facilitate the assignment of aircraft stands for the operational efficiency of aircraft washing, all airside users, (including but not limited to Apron Handling Agents (“AHA”)) are required to seek CAG’s approval prior to carrying out any exterior washing of aircraft at the designated aircraft stands at Changi Airport.

1.2 It is the responsibility of all airside users seeking to carry out aircraft washing to fully comply with the applicable laws, regulations, and requirements imposed by the relevant government authority, including but not limited to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (“CAAS”), the National Environment Agency (“NEA”) and/or the Public Utilities Board (“PUB”) (collectively, the “Relevant Laws”). The Relevant Laws shall include but are not limited to the Environmental Protection and Management Act (Cap. 94A) (“EPMA”).

## **2 Application Procedure**

2.1 To facilitate the assignment of aircraft stands for the operational efficiency of aircraft washing, all airside users, (including but not limited to Apron Handling Agents (“AHA”)) are required to seek CAG’s approval prior to carrying out any exterior washing of aircraft at the designated aircraft stands at Changi Airport.

2.2 If airside users intend to use chemicals for the purpose of aircraft washing, the Safety Data Sheets (“SDS”) of all such chemicals must be provided to CAG at least seven working days prior to the usage of such chemicals. Any chemicals used for aircraft washing must follow the Relevant Laws.

2.3 Provided that the airside users have met the requirements set out in this Airside Operations Notice and subject to the availability of the aircraft stands and operational requirements, CAG ACC will assign the appropriate aircraft stand(s) for the carrying out of aircraft washing.

2.4 Notwithstanding that ACC has already assigned an aircraft stand for aircraft washing, the relevant airside users are to contact ACC promptly prior to the start of the aircraft washing and immediately after completion of the aircraft washing in question.

## **3 General Requirements for Aircraft Washing**

### **Aircraft Washing at Aircraft Stands**


3.1 Aircraft washing may only be carried out at aircraft stands assigned by ACC (subject to availability and operational requirements), and which are fitted with grease/oil separators.

3.2 The current list of aircraft stands fitted with grease/oil separators that may be assigned by ACC are:

Location	Aircraft Stands

Terminal 1 Contact Stands	Nil
Terminal 2 Contact Stands	Nil
Terminal 3 Contact Stands	A3, A4, A16, A17, A18, A19, B3, B4
Terminal 4 Contact Stands	G18 (L/R), G19 (L/R)
Remote Stands	205, 206, 207, 208 (L/R), 461, 462 (L/R), 463 (L/R), 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 951 (L/R), 952, 953 (L/R), 954 (L/R)
Cargo Stands	503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516 (L/R), 517 (L/R), 600 (L/R), 605

3.3 Please refer to the map of the location of these aircraft stands fitted with grease/oil separators:



3.4 If the assigned aircraft stand for aircraft washing is found to be in an unsatisfactory condition after the aircraft washing has been conducted, CAG may carry out such remedial measures as CAG in its discretion considers necessary (including but not limited to engaging an environmental cleaning contractor to clean the aircraft stand) and all costs and expenses incurred thereby shall be charged to the relevant aircraft owner/operator and/or AHA accordingly.

### **Allowed Timings for Aircraft Washing**

3.5 Aircraft washing is allowed only between the period 0100 Local Time to 0500 Local Time.

### **Type of Chemicals/Detergents used for Aircraft Washing**

3.6 Only quick break, biodegradable chemicals/detergent for aircraft washing that is compliant with the Relevant Laws, as well as any other rules or procedures as may be imposed by CAG from time to time shall be used for aircraft washing.

3.7 Chemicals/detergents not certified as quick break and biodegradable may result in soil and/or groundwater contamination and are not permitted to be used for aircraft washing at Changi airside.

3.8 In line with the ISO14001 Environment Management System, airside users are to submit the SDS and the planned disposal method of any new chemicals/detergents for aircraft washing to CAG. The SDS submitted should state the recommended waste disposal method (e.g., onsite disposal, offsite treatment) with clear indication that it follows the Relevant Laws. In the event where the SDS does not contain such information, the airside users will be required to produce the relevant written approval from NEA and/or PUB, failing which such chemicals shall not be used for aircraft washing at Changi Airport.

3.9 CAG reserves the right to require such further information or documentation from the airside users at any time to demonstrate that the airside users has met the requirements in this Airside Operations Notice, failing which CAG may, at its sole discretion, refuse to assign any further aircraft stands for the purposes of aircraft washing until such information or documentation has been provided to the reasonable satisfaction of CAG.

### **Other Aircraft Washing Requirements**

3.10 The above requirements shall apply in addition to the Relevant Laws, as well as any other rules or procedures as may be imposed by CAG from time to time.




## **ANNEX VI – FORM 1: AIRCRAFT WASHING AT CHANGI AIRPORT APRON**


1. Please indicate your company:
  
2. Aircraft registration:
  
3. Proposed date of washing (Note: washing can only take place between 0100 and 0500 LT):
  
4. Proposed type of washing (water-based / chemical-based):
  
5. Has Safety Data Sheet (SDS) been sent to CAG previously? (Note: for chemical-based washing only): Yes / No
  
6. Proposed aircraft stand:
  
7. Person-in-charge name:
  
8. Person-in-charge contact number:

# ANNEX VII - MARS LAYOUT AND A380 LAYOUT

## MARS Layout



## A380 Layout



## ANNEX VIII – EXCEPTIONS TO PLB WHEEL POSITIONS

The following exceptions apply for:

### (1) Pre-Arrival/Arrival Phase

- i. For A380 aircraft type, the wheels of the PLB L3 arm must be in the pre-position box.
- ii. For code E aircraft in the MARS Centreline Stand, the wheels of the PLB L2 arm must be in the pre-position box.
- iii. For code C aircraft in the MARS Right Stand, the wheels of the PLB L1 arm must be in the pre-position box.  
(See Annex VII for the MARS and A380 layout)

### (2) Pre-Departure/Departure Phase

- i. For A380 aircraft type, the wheel of the PLB L3 arm is to be in the pre-position box
- ii. For code E aircraft in the MARS Centreline Stand, the wheels of the PLB L2 arm must be in the pre-position box.
- iii. For code C aircraft in the MARS Right Stand, the wheels of the PLB L1 arm must be in the pre-position box.  
(See Annex VI for the MARS and A380 layout)
- iv. PLB Operator is to retract the PLB from the aforementioned pre-position box to the park box after the aircraft is fully out of the ERA.